

Terrorism - as an Object of Socio-Philosophical Analysis

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1. Abstract

The paper works in a chronological manner in its quest to understand the phenomenon of terrorism in terms of socio-philosophical reasoning and analysis. Terrorism is one of the most relevant socio-political factors that is, currently almost every region of the world. Societal impact of terror attacks is not just limited to the public facet, but extends down to the individual level thereby affecting the individual members of society as well. The research is based on works by experts in the field and entailed field work including focus group interviews and case study analysis. The paper begins by first identifying the definitions and ideation behind terrorism, and has later considered ideas such as the waves of terrorism, essential nature and rationale of the terrorist mindset, and has also formed certain assumptions regarding the inherent motivations behind terrorism. The research also features certain theoretical frameworks put forward by authorities in the field and attempts to employ them in the current scenario of the world. The paper ends by presenting the findings of the research and lists certain policy recommendations regarding policy formulation at the local and national levels.

2. Chapter 1: Introduction

2.1 Background to the Research

Terrorism has evolved as a global phenomenon. Terrorism as a phenomenon is multidimensional where different philosopher, political scientists, historians, sociologists, internationalists, lawyers and economists have tried to look into the terrorism and subsequent problems. The research problems are based on the uniqueness and specificity where requires inter disciplinary methods. According to Cunningham (2003) the need is to develop and institutionalize terror-logy that is based on a knowledge base in context to terrorism and the activities to counter them. Human kind is facing terrorism since long where it was used an incisive illegal tool that was effective in the

political oriented struggles (Lentini, 2008). The international phenomenon of terrorism was created in 20th century; however Aristotle was the first to use the term “terror” to explain the methods used to influence the crowds when the ancient Greek theaters displayed tragedy (Mahan & Griset, 2008). Terrorism evolved as the object of researchers during French Revolution. The foundation was laid by Robespierre and Marat who discussed the political power in context to fear that deduced the concept of terror. The term was defined in dictionary for the first time in French Academy of Science as “system of fear” (Parry, 2013).

Great Britain gave terrorism a different meaning that is “reign with horror” (Young 2006). In context of Russian literature terrorism is elaborated through a deep theoretical framework based on different opinions and interpretations. Literature is full of definition of terrorism where each definition is based on different approaches and the case that can be termed as international. Several researchers have termed terrorism as “system of fear” where others have defined it in context to religious extremists and fanatic’s representation of actions (Player, Skipper & Lambert, 2002).

However this research considers terrorism and terror as two separate concepts. Terrorism is defined as a premeditated, politically backed violence where it is carried out in majority as to target third parties with no particular link with terror activities and subsequent aims having the focus on compelling the authorities to fulfill the needs of the terrorists. On the other hand terror is based on mass scale violent act (psychological, physical or ideological) that is based on social- political set up based on unlimited power of social strata that convinces a specific behavior in the masses (Schmid, 2012).

Terrorism became a significant issue in the modern international relations where the problem of international terrorism evolved in late 1960 and has been a serious issue despite efforts to combat it till today (Weinberg, Pedahzur & Hirsch-Hoefler, 2004). In order to describe the phenomenon of international terrorism a clear distinction is created between the international terrorism and the acts of terror at a domestic level. However the policies approaches are different in the world due to which there is no international terrorism act (Ganor, 2002).

International terrorism is defined under the US Code Laws of Title 18 which states that international terrorism is (i) is a set of violent actions that is dangerous to human life (ii) committed act with intimidate intentions or force a civil population; or to impact government policy (iii) criminals committing an action within United States

jurisdiction or outside the border to coerce or intimidate United States or any country where the offender stays or tries to seek political asylum (Goodman & Jinks, 2004). The same cod of law under the Title 22 has also given the definition of international terrorism more clearly by stating that terror activities include territory or citizens of one or more countries. Thus it is clear that trans-nationality if the basic factor of international terrorism.

In the light of the Military Encyclopedic Dictionary (2001) the international terrorism is a representation of any violent act that is conducted against objects or persons protected under the international law. The extremist organizations use these violent activities as a political struggle to accelerate pressure on different international matters mainly over one government or other state. However this definition does not lay demarcation among the international terrorism and domestic terrorism (Ruby, 2002). Therefore this research aims at identifying international terrorism as the destruction of interstate relations, global principles and values.

Agrawal (2011) an Indian researcher defined international terrorism and its subsequent elements of criminal acts where he concluded that the international terrorism is based on use of violence and threat of violence, creating dangerous conditions for innocent people and general public with the crime of international nature. Agrawal (2011) has defined that the acts of terrorists also have some impact on international relations but does not threaten the international relations or the international rule of law however it does impacts the people and population that have no link to the terrorist activities and its subsequent objectives.

In the light of the different definition of the international terrorism it can be concluded that international terrorism is the use of state and non-state violence and also the threat of violence that will be focused on harming the international relations, threat to the peaceful states and coexistence of people, having a senseless loss of life that is used for pressurizing different subjects based on international activities and terrifying social, political and religious leaders (Bayman 2014).

These definitions have given the detailed characteristics of international terrorism.

3. Historical Contextualization

3.1 Terror in Antiquity: 1st -14th Century AD

The earliest known organization that exhibited aspects of a modern terrorist organization was the Zealots of Judea. Known to the Romans as sicarii, or dagger-men, they carried on an underground campaign of assassination of Roman occupation forces, as well as any Jews they felt had collaborated with the Romans. Their motive was an uncompromising belief that they could not remain faithful to the dictates of Judaism while living as Roman subjects. Eventually, the Zealot revolt became open, and they were finally besieged and committed mass suicide at the fortification of Masada. The Assassins were the next group to show recognizable characteristics of terrorism, as we know it today. A breakaway faction of Shia Islam called the Nizari Ismalis adopted the tactic of assassination of enemy leaders because the cult's limited manpower prevented open combat. Their leader, Hassam-I Sabbah, based the cult in the mountains of Northern Iran. Their tactic of sending a lone assassin to successfully kill a key enemy leader at the certain sacrifice of his own life (the killers waited next to their victims to be killed or captured) inspired fearful awe in their enemies. Even though both the Zealots and the Assassins operated in antiquity, they are relevant today: First as forerunners of modern terrorists in aspects of motivation, organization, targeting, and goals. Secondly, although both were ultimate failures, the fact that they are remembered hundreds of years later, demonstrates the deep psychological impact they caused.

3.2 Early Origins of Terrorism: 14th -18th Century

From the time of the Assassins (late 13th century) to the 1700s, terror and barbarism were widely used in warfare and conflict, but key ingredients for terrorism were lacking. Until the rise of the modern nation state after the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, the sort of central authority and cohesive society that terrorism attempts to influence barely existed. Communications were inadequate and controlled, and the causes that might inspire terrorism (religious schism, insurrection, ethnic strife) typically led to open warfare. By the time kingdoms and principalities became nations, they had sufficient means to enforce their authority and suppress activities such as terrorism. The French Revolution provided the first uses of the words "Terrorist" and "Terrorism". Use of the word "terrorism" began in 1795 in reference to the Reign of Terror initiated by the Revolutionary government. The agents of the Committee

of Public Safety and the National Convention that enforced the policies of "The Terror" were referred to as "Terrorists". The French Revolution provided an example to future states in oppressing their populations. It also inspired a reaction by royalists and other opponents of the Revolution who employed terrorist tactics such as assassination and intimidation in resistance to the Revolutionary agents. The Parisian mobs played a critical role at key points before, during, and after the Revolution. Such extra-legal activities as killing prominent officials and aristocrats in gruesome spectacles started long before the guillotine was first used.

3.3 Post Industrial Revolution Era: The 19th Century

During the late 19th century, radical political theories and improvements in weapons technology spurred the formation of small groups of revolutionaries who effectively attacked nation-states. Anarchists espousing belief in the "propaganda of the deed" produced some striking successes, assassinating heads of state from Russia, France, Spain, Italy, and the United States. However, their lack of organization and refusal to cooperate with other social movements in political efforts rendered anarchists ineffective as a political movement. In contrast, Communism's role as an ideological basis for political terrorism was just beginning, and would become much more significant in the 20th century. Another trend in the late 19th century was the increasing tide of nationalism throughout the world, in which the nation (the identity of a people) and the political state were combined. As states began to emphasize national identities, peoples that had been conquered or colonized could, like the Jews at the times of the Zealots, opt for assimilation or struggle. The best-known nationalist conflict from this time is still unresolved - the multi-century struggle of Irish nationalism. Nationalism, like communism, became a much greater ideological force in the 20th century. The terrorist group from this period that serves as a model in many ways for what was to come was the Russian Narodnya Volya (Peoples Will). They differed in some ways from modern terrorists, especially in that they would sometimes call off attacks that might endanger individuals other than their intended target. Other than this quirk, we see many of the traits of terrorism here for the first time; clandestine, cellular organization; impatience and inability for the task of organizing the constituents they claim to represent; and a tendency to increase the level of violence as pressures on the group mount.

4. Defining Terrorism

The United States Department of Defense defines terrorism as *the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological*. Within this definition, there are three key elements

- violence,
- fear,
- Intimidation and each element produces terror in its victims.

4.1 Definition by the FBI

The United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) uses this definition:

"Terrorism is the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives."

The U.S. Department of State defines terrorism to be:

"...premeditated politically-motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience".

Outside the United States Government, there are greater variations in what features of terrorism are emphasized in definitions.

4.2 Definition by the United Nations

In 1992 The United Nations gave the following definition of terrorism

"An anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby - in contrast to assassination - the direct targets of violence are not the main targets."

Terrorism definition that is universally accepted is given by U.N. that also includes the above lines and includes the following two sentences at the end:

"message generators" and "violence based communication processes".

In 1974 the British Government definition of terrorism was given as

"...the use of violence for political ends, and includes any use of violence for the purpose of putting the public, or any section of the public, in fear."

5. The Waves of Terrorism

5.1 The First Wave of Terrorism

The anarchists in the 1880s are the first wave that is followed by an anti-colonial wave from the 1920s on. And this again is followed by a new left wave, what he calls a new left wave. You could also call it the, the red terrorism that started in the 1960s. And then finally, the fourth wave is the religious wave, which according to David Rapoport, started in the year 1979. Let's have a look at each of these waves, starting with the anarchists. Well, according to David Rapoport that wave started in the 1880s, some say 1870s and it started in Russia. And from there on, it spread to other parts of the world, Western Europe, America and also Asia. A number of Russian writers with their doctrine or strategy of terror is defined. Bakunin and Kropotkin were the most famous ones. And they very much used the new technologies, new communication tools of their age, such as the telegraph and mass media in those days, newspapers. One of the most notorious organizations of that era is the Russian organization Narodnaya Volya. The name can best be translated as, the people's will. Well, members of that group killed, amongst others, a Russian tsar and in those days that was definitely breaking news. And according to David Rapoport these people call themselves terrorists and the 1890s has been described as the Golden Age of Assassination. Well it lasted from 1890s on also to the early twentieth century, and some of its victims were the Elizabeth, the Empress of Austria Uberto the first, King of Italy. And a US, a United States President. It was, and here you see a picture of the man President McKinley of the United States who was killed in Buffalo, the state of New York, and this picture is actually one of the last pictures or the last picture taken of him.

5.2 The Second Wave of Terrorism

The second wave of terrorism that is distinguished by David Rapoport is the wave of the anti-colonialists. What were their main characteristics? Well David Rapoport says it started in the 1920s. And it can be described as a struggle for self-determination, for independence, to liberate certain parts of the world. Former, well now, now former colonies from their occupiers, French rule, British rule, etc. And the tactics these groups used were different from those in the previous wave and they used guerrilla tactics which was difficult for the powers, the British Empire, the French to deal with hit and run tactics. And some of these groups were quite successful in managing to; well almost defeat their opposing forces. Also very important is that, according to David Rapoport, these rebels stopped calling themselves terrorists and were beginning to use the term freedom fighters. So, they were not terrorists. The terrorists were the other party. And they were fighting, they were struggling against what they would call government terror. Among the most well known organizations of that wave is the IRA. The Irish Republican Army who from the 1920s on and a little bit earlier was fighting for an independent, a free Irish state and also a united one. And then another group that is linked to this anti-colonial wave is the FLN, the Front de Liberation Nationale a group of Algerians who managed in the end to fight for an independent Algeria, who were fighting French rule.

5.3 The Third Wave of Terrorism

The third organization is Irgun, a militant Zionist group that was fighting the British authorities who at that time were governing what we now call Israel and Palestine. The following is the picture of the attack on the King David Hotel in Jerusalem that was at that time the headquarters of the British mandatory authorities over Palestine.



The third wave of terrorism according to David Rapport is referred as “new left wave” Or “extreme left terrorism,” The terrorism that started in the 1960s included the Red Brigades, the autonomic faction, and other groups. The wave raged from the Vietnam Warin the late 1950s to 1970s through which several groups were born especially in Western Europe and North America. According to David Rapport one of the groups that were evolved in the time period was Weather Underground that was based upon students from North America, and autonomy in Germany saw themselves as vanguards for the masses of the Third World. More groups that were evolved include the revolutionary groups of Latin America that practiced urban guerrilla in order to fight the authorities, governments. These received support from Soviet Union and its allies. The context of the third wave of terrorism joins the Cold War. Taking the view of the international level, in that time period the international terrorism was much associated with Palestinians and in particular the Palestinian Liberation Organization, the PLO of Yasser Arafat. These terrorists groups adopted the modus operandi based on hostage takings and hijackings. For example in 1972 they took the Israeli athlete as hostages during the Olympic Games in Munich. That event, and in particular also the hostage taking, was watched by millions around the globe. The organization behind it was called Black September, and unfortunately it ended with all the athletes being killed, partly in an attempt to liberate them. The hijackings of those days were especially aimed at planes. Here is the picture of Western Airlines 329 hijacked in 1972



The main goal was to get attention for a certain cause, or to press free some of the co-fighters of the terrorists. And in those days most of them who had been hijacked in planes managed to get out of it alive as the intention of the terrorists was not to kill these people but to use them as a tool to create, to get attention or to press governments to do something.

5.4 The Fourth Wave of Terrorism

The fourth and last wave distinguished by David Rapoport is what he calls the religious wave, which started in 1979, the year of the Islamic revolution in Iran. The year the Soviet Union invaded and occupied Afghanistan in 1979 was also the year of the storming and occupation of the Grand Mosque in Mecca. Well, David Rapoport shows that there were many different religious groups that produced terrorism since 1979. He mentions Islam, many Islamic groups but also the Sikh who from Punjab from their holy center, their holy temple, the golden temple in Amritsar, were for instance fighting the Indian authorities. But it also includes Jewish religious terrorists. Think of the murderer of Yitzhak Rabin who was killed in 1995 while giving a speech in Tel Aviv. Well here you see the memorial site to remember that event and to remember the Israeli Prime Minister. But the religious waves also includes Christian groups think of anti-abortion militants who have killed quite a number of people and it also includes sects. And the most well known attack of one sect is the attack on the Tokyo subway by the Aum sect. Let me try to pronounce it in Japanese the Aum Shinrikyo sect who was responsible for an attack with unconventional

weapons. The nerve gas used was sarin in which they tried to kill quite a few people. In the end, they managed to kill 12 and injure more than a thousand. Well here you have a picture of that event which according to many, is one of the first and most well know attacks with WMD, weapons of mass destruction. Well, fortunately they didn't manage to create a mass destruction. But unfortunately quite a number of people were injured and a number, 12 of them killed. Other characteristics of this wave include the modus operandi of, of these religious groups. And like in earlier waves, its assassinations of key leaders the military representatives of states, as well as hostage takings, and new is the suicide bombing. It's associated with this wave especially the first attacks by the Lebanese militant Shiite organization called Hezbollah attacks on the US and French military forces in Lebanon. Where they used trucks with suicide terrorism blew up the headquarters of the Americans and the French. But at the same time I should stress that suicide bombings also happened among non religious groups. The Kurdish workers parties, a Mao separatists group in Turkey, as well as the Tamil Tigers who were trying to liberate or create autonomy for the Tamils on the island of Sri Lanka, in the state of Sri Lanka. And of course the groups that are associated with this wave include Al Qaeda. That is first mentioned and, and first, for the first time making headlines with its attack on the US Embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi and here you see a picture of the devastation after the attack in Dar es Salaam. Al Qaeda associated with this particular fourth wave of terrorism. So according to David Rapoport, there are four waves of terrorism. That each lasts about a few decades after which they might be still there but attract a lot less sympathizers and supporters and gradually fade out. That leaves us with a very interesting question. If this is true, what would be the fifth wave of terrorism? In sum, the phenomenon of groups and individuals using terrorism is not new. There are examples of pre-modern times and modern day terrorism has at least four different waves

6. Theoretical and Methodological Approach

The theoretical and methodological reasons for the terrorism analysis is interdisciplinary methods for studying terrorism that was established a decade ago based on linking political science with philosophy, law and sociology disciplines (Nacos 2016). Therefore different methodological approach to study terrorism has been used by scholars that include psychological, geopolitical, sociological, civilization in context to global system (Beck 2008). However this research is only aimed at looking and the sociological and psychological context of terrorism. According to the

psychological approach the terrorism is seen in context to psychology and personality of the terrorists. According to researchers it is very important to take in depth study of the psychology of terrorism and the subsequent issues of managing this phenomenon so that it assists in understanding a reliable base (Moghaddam, 2005). However this concept is still not discovered in details and has many subsequent challenges. According to Roshchin (2001) there are three psychological models dependent on a terrorists personality that are (i) psycho fanatics following their ideology, religion or political interests believing that their actions are useful to the society regardless of the result (ii) the frustrated individual due to any inability or any reason that he is unable to achieve his goals which developed inevitable violent actions (iii) a man who belongs to flawed family who has suffered ill treatment as a child from parents, suffered social isolation, no good relations that has made him embittered person having anti-social personality. All these three psychological issues and condition are the foundation of terrorist organizations.

Olshansky (2002), a Russian researcher analyzed individual terrorist and identified the most prominent psychological syndromes of a terrorists personality. He mentioned (i) zombie syndrome which shows that the person is in constant battle over highly reactive spirit developed because of enmity with opponents (ii) Rambo syndrome which is the most significant feature where the person is achieving a mission taken voluntarily to him that is heavy but noble at the same time (iii) Kamizkaze syndrome where the person is self-destructive of himself and the also about the victims in a terror activity

However Olshansky has also concluded that the root cause of terrorism is not only the psychology but is more inclined towards economic, political and social links. People evolve terrorists not only because of psychological abnormality but due to political, ideological, economical and religious reasons. In addition to that Russian researcher Lauritsen and Archakova (2008) who studied the psychological characteristics of political extremists and subsequent terrorism identified three characteristics required to become a part of a terrorist group based on leaders and ideology, managers or administrators and trained fighters or infantry.

On the other hand the sociological approach is based on human conditions (poverty, deprivation and human rights violation) that contribute in terrorism (Hudson, & Majeska, 1999). According to statistics more than 1.3 billion are poverty stricken in the world, more than billion people are not involved in productive labor and millions of people are illiterate (Strang & Sun, 2017). Statistics also shows that every second person in the world doesn't have basic

necessities like electricity (Jacobs, 2016). More than 2 billion people have no access to safe drinking water (Russell, 2016), 3 billion in the world live in unsanitary situations, and 900 million are starving out of which 200 million are children (Riches, 2016). Similarly in poor states 14 million children are dying per year from diseases that are incurable and 500 thousand women are dying while child birth(Herrington et al 2016).

Thus terrorists organizations exists all over the world taking an account of this global phenomenon through statistics it is shown that almost every part of the world is facing terrorism. For example the statistics from United States State Department shows that 10,000 people have died in terror activities (Beydoun, 2016) whereas in Afghanistan more than 2.5 thousand people have been killed due to terror activities and is considered the number one country being affected (Wolf, 2016). The second country to be affected in Iraq and third is Pakistan where Russia and Nigeria stands at the fifth position (650 people died) among the countries that are facing terror activities. However taking an account of European Union the statistics from law enforcement agencies shows that only 17 people were killed in 2012 in a terrorist activity (Wu & Knoke, 2017). Similarly US State Department stated that only 10 US citizens were killed in terrorist activity where all of them were in Afghanistan and none of them was killed in US territory. This ratio is considerably low as compared to the deaths in countries such as Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iraq (Williamson 2016). India being a large country is also facing terrorism where statistics have shown high number of deaths in terror activities.

These terror activities also have a negative impact on the bi-lateral relationships of the countries and also communities as it disturbs the security and peace (Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2008). Therefore this research is based upon identifying the social philosophical framework of terrorism. These realities have led the panel to focus on this topic from two different angles – understanding and combating terrorism in Pakistan by looking into the underlying causes. The attempt to define terrorism is sometimes as hard as the fight against terrorism itself. Since it is an international phenomenon, responses to terrorism must also be on an international scale. Developing an effective international strategy required agreement on a ‘definition of terrorism. Without having a clear and just understanding of the phenomenon of terrorism, no responsibility can be fixed on countries supporting terrorism and no steps can be taken to combat terrorist organizations and their allies. There is need to distinguish between terrorism and struggle for national liberation. The paper will seek to underline the difference between freedom

struggles and terrorism, pointing out cases of forcible occupation and denial of fundamental rights. The debate on terrorism needs to rid itself of the notion that Islam stands for terrorism. In order to deal with the problem, the primary prerequisite is to stop talking in terms of 'Islamic terrorism'. Islam is frequently misperceived by the non-Muslim World. Now it has become more urgent than ever to clear up such misperceptions. Terrorism should not be associated with any religion or with any nationality. They cannot be called Muslim, Christian, Hindu or Jewish terrorists. Terrorism is a specific weapon in the struggle for political power, employed either by extremist political groups or by national minorities or marginalized and deprived sections of societies in the world. There is nothing new about it as a general phenomenon nor is it confined to any particular group, religion, philosophy or continent. To curb the menace of terrorism, it is necessary to have comprehensive analysis of the social framework and nature of contemporary terrorism. Philosophy with its logic-integrative apparatus must formulate the concept; answer the question about the nature and essence of terrorism as destructive phenomena of social life.

7. Research Objectives

- To comprehensively analyze the social framework and nature of contemporary terrorism
- Philosophy with its logic-integrative apparatus must formulate the concept; answer the question about the nature and essence of terrorism as destructive phenomena of social life.

In order to achieve this goal, the following objectives:

- submit a socio-philosophical interpretation of the phenomenon of modern terrorism;
- show the transformation of basic characteristics and possible conditions of the emergence of terrorism in contemporary society;
- identify and justify the structure and classification of the contemporary forms of terrorism;
- to undertake an analysis of the phenomenon of terrorism in the framework of the theory of social action;
- to identify the characteristics of terrorism and its social foundation, based on cultural differences of modern civilizations;
- explore sign-interpret form of modern terrorism and its possible manipulation of public consciousness.

8. Significance of the study

In order to comprehensively take an in depth analysis of what terrorism actually is this research has taken the view of the process of terrorism and how it has evolved till today and what methods can be used to stop it. This study has taken the perspective of social philosophical factors that compels a person to get involved in a terror activity. The study takes a look at the comprehending the different stages such as the factors driving the individual to join or leave a terrorist organization. This research will take account of several face of terrorism and socio philosophy process that assist to determine the causes and help in defining the reducing the effects.

Concrete data is being collected by several psychologists to identify the factors that contribute in making terrorists so that it can help in developing methods to thwart it. It is not easy to determine what is actually driving people to become terrorism. This is due to the fact that terrorists do not volunteer to become an experimental group and therefore it is difficult to conclude and examine terror activities from far with possibility or errors. Moreover terrorists for one school of thought are another's freedom fighter for instance the Palestinian suicide bombers are supported largely by Arabs.

Therefore it is important to understand the negative implications of the potential aggressive terror policing on the human rights that should be taken in the account of social framework that is further dependent on communication. This communication needs a definition of terrorism terminology as it is influencing communication and the subsequent response to the problem as to decrease the negative effects on society and politics.

In order to implement a counter measure against secular and religious terrorism this research aims at determining their modus operandi, potential and objectives. This research is an investigation of the social process that will assist in countering the functional level. This research wants to establish a peaceful countermeasure that will help in building a link between terrorist behaviour and the society. This research also believes that without isolating the terrorists and putting social pressure as it compels a person to use violence to protest and explain his ideology. Similar social philosophical based counter measures have been used after 9/11 by the inter faith groups, community associations and political parties for countering the religious based terrorism through which U.S has established

various communities for education and anti-hate programs designed to minimize the ignorance in between them (Husband and Alam 2011).

The urgency of a theme of research is primarily that the socio-economic and socio-political crisis in the global community contributes to the revitalization of the activities of terrorist groups. This situation forces researchers to apply again and again to rethink the phenomenon of terrorism. In spite of the fact that the phenomenon of terrorism in one way or another, IURE always present in social life, namely modern terrorism and forms stood in a row with such global problems of our society, economy, ecology, politics, demography, etc. Terrorist acts gave rise to large-scale military conflicts and serve as a catalyst for global disasters. The destructive scale of modern international terrorism so great that gives reason to consider this phenomenon as a primary threat to all humanity in the twenty-first century.

Consideration of the various aspects of the phenomenon of terrorism has traditionally been approached by scientists of many disciplines and areas. In historical sciences has an extensive documentary and chronological framework in sociology describes the private situation of terrorist activities in political science are the aspects of the legal and political nature of terror. However, there is no comprehensive analysis of the social framework and nature of contemporary terrorism. Philosophy with its logic-integrative apparatus must formulate the concept, answer the question about the nature and essence of terrorism as destructive phenomena of social life.

The relevance of the research topic due to the fact that ' modern terrorism, political, cultural and economic life, now appears as a peculiar and highly complex system of a social community, as, for example, the so-called Islamic State. Terrorist activity has always been directed at solving problems and achieving goals without regard to moral and ethical standards. Terrorism in contemporary society is organized at different levels — from individual: and a small group (joint community interests and ideology) to macro which "absorb" State and civilization education. The above defines the need for the study of terrorism at tsenoj relationship with the processes of globalization.

Another important aspect of the relevance of socio-philosophical analysis of the problem of terrorism is that social practice, many researchers did not differentiate between private definitions of terrorism, do not reveal the essence

of the phenomenon of terrorism as a holistic phenomenon and enjoy operational (concrete, situational) definitions, to identify objects and analysis within the framework of relevant scientific position or studied aspect.

9. Socio-Philosophical conceptions of Terrorism

Socio philosophy is defined as the study of social behaviours with the interpretation of social institutions and society in context to the ethics and norms rather than its relations (Mahanta, 2016). The social philosophical conception of terrorism will take the analysis for the perspective of political, moral, legal and cultural aspect that will lead to the development of the theoretical framework. Thus terrorism is understood through the social context and the methods through which the nation state reacts to such activities (Baele, 2014).

Before the September 11 attack the field of sociology did not have much concern with terrorism. However since 9/11 sociological traditions have taken interest in terrorism in context to the moral panic, media coverage, organizational responses and counter terrorism (Vertigans, 2013). Sociologists had ignored terrorism prior to September 11 incident. Weinberg, Pedahzzur and Hirsch Hoefler (2004) was one the first sociologist that defined terrorism after analysing more than 70 definitions from 50 articles stating that terrorism is motivated politically involving threat and utilization of force and violence where the publicity pursuit plays important role. However they also highlighted that this definition ignores the symbolic factors. Thus to assess terror this research takes the point of sociology.

After 9/11 sociologists such as Mathieu Deflem, S.E. Costanza and John C. Kilburn Jr highlighted the importance of developing sub field in sociology that will study terrorism (Milosevska, 2014). This field is aimed at studying the military spending, immigrations, counter terrorism, privacy issue and Israeli- Palestinian conflicts in the light of power, propaganda, media and nationality. Initially the sociologists examined terrorism in context to policing and response of citizens against terror. The literature shows that it was based on examining and concluding the link between first responders (rescue teams, police etc.) and the communities. According to Ramirez, Hoopes and Quinlan (2003) concluded that the police have to change the styles of people profiling after 9/11. Delone (2007) also stated that the mission statement of the police agencies has changed. The conclusion was made that even the local police agencies feels pressure in managing the terrorism issue.

Sociology recently have reflected terrorism in a philosophical method and aimed on the moral panic and over expenditure after 9/11. According to Costanza and Kilburn (2005) have highlighted that symbolism is significant in comprehending the war on terror. In the light of symbolic inter-actionist the homeland security problem with respect to the public sentiment has created policies more so than concrete and real threats. Symbolism has motivates agency of policy of hyper vigilance in decision making that is un-testable and costly.

Legal scholars and sociologists have identified the consequences of militaristic or aggressive policing of threat terror that have negative effects on the human rights that is being studied by the sociologists as social justice. Helms, Costanza and Johnson (2011) have stated that international level media hype can cause systemic and unnecessary over pursuit of cyber terror. The research concluded that this over reaction will develop a kill's witch policy that will provide ultimate power to federal government over internet.

It was stated by Maximiliano and Korstanje (2012) that 9/11 incident changed the security concepts especially in the West due to two reasons. The first reason was that the plan made by the terrorist was based on following the management guidebook and the second reason was the use of the symbolic bulwark of capitalism transportation against civilian target. The incident was a proof of terrorism intersection with the mobility's. Therefore after that there was a wave of terror among people as they did not feel safe anywhere. Moreover the counter response of 9/11 that was the "war on terror" ignited the problem rather than solving it. The specialists that are studding terrorism are challenged due to the reason that they have to reveal their source to police when they are contact any terrorist.

10. The Nature and Essence of Terrorism

There is a general agreement that the phenomenon of terrorism have several different elements and there is an agreement that terrorism is instrument or tactics to achieve certain goals by groups be it the state actors or non-state actors where the use of force is significant and a part of tactics (Brodziak, Różyk-Myrta & Ziółko, 2016). The essence of terrorism is thus the aim to induce fear among victims to compel the government or another target to alter its political behaviour.

Fear is the basic essence of terrorism where the aim is to spread fear and not much death as in majority a terror activity is not aimed at causing casualties but rather to cause many afraid (Мокляк, 2016). Terrorist manage to spread fear with limited sources. For instance the Netherland situation in 2005/ 2006 where according to public poll 40% of the Dutch were of the view that terrorism is the most significant issue the country is facing showing that they are more afraid as compared to the Spanish or British that experience much horrible attacks for example in Madrid with 200 casualties and London attack with 50 plus deaths (De Bie, de Poot & van der Leun, 2015). On the other hand Netherland only faced one terror attack made attempted by one terrorist killing one person who was the filmmaker. Similar conclusion was made by Brian Jenkins where he writes that terrorist aims at increased audience and not large number of death but a large number of witnesses. The statement was made in 1975 but seems relevant even today (Jenkins & Johnson, 1975).

The essence of terrorism is not only confined to the killings. The significant element is the direct target is not only the main target. For example 9/11 attack where 4000 people were killed were basically the indirect targets as the aim of terrorist was not to kill those people but to attract attention(Ying-ying, 2001). The main target was the viewers and witness of the terror activity. Thus the aim of the violence is not directed towards those who get killed but to those who live as well. The strategy of a terrorist is to kill one person or few but to scare millions (Jalata, 2016).

The global agreement is that terrorism is a tool, instrument and mechanism that used to spread fear through the use of violence so that it will impact society as well as politics. However due to an overreaction by the politics and society the impact of terror activity becomes enormous (Shahbazian, & Rogova, 2016).

11. Chapter 2: Social and practical issues: terrorism in modern society

There are five recognized general types of terrorism:

11.1 Political terrorism:

The political terrorism defines any act of terror that generates fear for the political sake (Sandler & Gaibullov, 2016; Cohen-Louck & Ben-David, 2017; Gaibullov, Piazza & Sandler, 2016).

11.2 Non – political terrorism:

The aim of the non-political terrorism is something that is different from political ends which may include organized crime for example when there is a murder of “stoolie” or when the loan borrower pays back by breaking the bones in order to remind the debtors to emit. Majority for the psychiatric cases falls in this category when they are not separately grouped under the “psychotic terrorism” (Sandler & Gaibulloev, 2016)

11.3 Quasi-terrorism:

The quasi terrorism explains the techniques used by terrorists during the crime that e performs. For example when the hostages are taken during the bank robbery. The term quasi terrorists actually refers to political terrorists language and rhetoric when trapped. They do so for justifying their selves and hide from the world the basic greed through the claims that violence is higher ideology (Sandler & Gaibulloev, 2016; Cohen-Louck & Ben-David, 2017; Gaibulloev, Piazza & Sandler, 2016).

12 Limited political terrorism:

The category of the limited politician terrorism defines the “statement making” where the acts are formulated to protect the political end however they are not focussing at other throw of the governmental or any other social framework. This category includes assassinations (Sandler & Gaibulloev, 2016; Cohen-Louck & Ben-David, 2017; Gaibulloev, Piazza & Sandler, 2016).

13 State terrorism

The population control is termed as the state terrorism through government mainly through the use of spreading fear. Such act of terrorism is applied by not only the opponents but by the government itself. In state terrorism states can be involved in different methods that are general support of terrorist organization, with assistance, directing or initiating attacks and even the terrorist attack perpetration by the state official agencies (Blakeley & Raphael, 2016). Terrorism acts that involves the state are all termed as the “state terrorism” or “state sponsored terrorism” (Blakeley2016). These designations play an important role of a political weapon where the opposing states attribute to one another and it is used by the terrorist organizations against the states. When the lethal force is applied by the state to a situation against civilians in order to break their resistance is termed as state terrorism. There are two main sub categories of state terrorism (i) internal state terrorism and (ii) external state terrorism (Jarvis & Lister, 2014).

a) Internal state terrorism has three key points. It is initiated to suppress the general public to either make them malleable or apolitical. It can also be initiated to weaken the people and their subsequent will to support revolution or a movement against government. The third motive can be further defined as:

- State oppression where the entire class deny the economic and social privileges irrespective of the regime support;
- State repression that defines the coercion or the threat of coercion for weakening the opponents in politics
- State terrorism also includes the violence that is used to generate fear and initiate compliance in a group and population segment.

b) External state terrorism defines when the lethal force is used against the group of population of another state in order to destroy or weaken the morale of the population and their support to their government (Green, 2014). The states that perpetrates the act of terrorism abroad with their official bodies/ members or even the security/ intelligence services or direct agents. In order to gain political aims a state intentionally conducts a terror act in another state on the civilians without the announcement of war.

There are three subcategories in which the external state terrorism can be discussed:

- Military terrorism that is based on the military forces that employ terror tactics against target entity
- State supported terror activity where the surrogate terror activity is against the target country. The link between the sponsoring state and the terrorists are murky and clandestine. These terrorists' organizations are supported by the states through financial aid, military, ideological support and operational assistance.
- The state terrorism example can be the Khmer Rouge Pol Pot government in Kampuchea, Indian army suppression in Kashmir and Israeli occupation in Palestine. Similarly it was stated by President Pervez Musharraf during addressing the summit under the topic "Fighting Terrorism For humanity" in New York that state terrorism is the most deadly form of terrorism that are aimed at targeting population that are fighting for their freedom from

foreign occupation where they gave the example of Indian policies in the Indian occupied Kashmir as example.

14 Revolutionary terrorism:

The aim of ‘revolutionary terrorist’ is to aim at a complete collapse of the regime under target and complete destruction of coercion forces that are struggling to replace the old system with their own. Such type of terrorism is also defined as the “agitation terrorism or terror from below” (Hutchinson, 1972). However the struggle can be labelled differently depending on the different angle of the divide as if there is repression, unrepresented and totalitarian from incumbent government. The aim of the terrorist is not to break the country but they intend to maintain the geographical border integrity while looking to replace the set up existence. This movement is different from the fight for the right of self-determination that is initiated by the large number of population in the confined area to seek an independent homeland (Bentley, 2016). The examples are Chechnya and Kashmir. There are two main types of terrorism in this category that are defined below

- Global: The terrorist in this type of terrorism have the aim to bring a global level change. For example Al Qaeda’s fight against the hegemony of US falls in this category.
- Limited: This category of terrorism aims at terrorism against a specific state in order to bring a change in the system or government

15 Conflict of civilizations and religious terrorism

The book “Clash of Civilization and remaking of new world order” written by Huntington has been widely acclaimed for its originality and analytically relevant to present environment and Terrorism scenario. This book in particular considers the effects of globalization on different parts of the world and presents the idea that Islamic extremism is the biggest threat to the long enduring American World Order. The idea is predicated on the understanding of the effects of ideological indoctrination in the Islamic world and foresees a grand showdown of power between Islam and the rest of the world. Huntington’s work is well researched and draws upon historical precedents and proposes some very disturbing conclusions, all the while establishing a firm foundation for his arguments. Huntington avoids the use of excessive rhetoric and jargon, and presents his analysis in a precise and

flexible manner. His style is distinct from that of other political scientists in the field and although the argument is circumstantial, it can be easily understood by the average reader.

The author divides the world into nine distinct small civilizations, each different from each other basing on culture, blood, language, way of life or society and religion parts. The civilizations are Western, Orthodox Christian, Islamic, Sub-Saharan African, Latin American, Chinese, Korean, Vietnamese, Hindu (Indian), Buddhist and Japanese. As pointed out in the later parts of this review, the books importance has become paramount after the end of the Cold War. Huntington believes that the predominant presumption that is prevalent in the United States that the collapse of communism points inevitably towards the worldwide embrace of democratic capitalism and universal deference to Western values is false. Such expectations, according to Huntington, are both fatuous and pernicious. He sets out to eliminate them in the book.

16 Latest Wave of Terrorism

13.1 India

Ethnic insurrections in no less than four states in India's upper east – Assam, Manipur, Nagaland and Tripura – hold on at levels of low-power war, and Left-wing radicalism, especially in Andhra Pradesh, and, in blend with standing wars in Bihar, are bringing on developing concern.

Security issues related with different revolts, especially in the debated region of Kashmir, hold on in India. On 1 October 2001, 31 people were executed and keeping in mind that 60 harmed when activists exploded a bomb at the principle passageway of Jammu and Kashmir administrative gathering working in Srinagar. Prior on 13 December 2001, an equipped gathering assaulted India's parliament in New Delhi. The episode brought about the demise of 13 psychological oppressors and security staff. India pointed the finger at Lashar-e-Tayba and Jaish-e-Mohammad for the assault and requested that Government of Pakistan arrangement promptly and sternly with the fear monger bunches working from Pakistan or Pakistan-controlled region.

The present thaw in relations notwithstanding, India continues to be the primary source of military threat to Pakistan. The emerging situation in Afghanistan and Iran has afforded an opportunity to India to exploit the terrorist threat faced by Pakistan to her advantage. In realization of her grand design of becoming a regional power, India

seeks a politically discredited and economically as well as morally weak Pakistan. The present IS situation in Pakistan characterized by nationalist, ethnic and sectarian problems presents an ideal opportunity to India to realize her nefarious designs.

It is an established fact that the sectarian, ethnic and nationalist groups are being sponsored by RAW. Most such groups are provided funds through different channels. Evidence is available that in some cases when the sectarian parties themselves failed to create bloodshed RAW agents organized attacks on rival religious establishments and mosque to keep the pot boiling. Two arrested RAW agents, namely Abdul Majeed of Sharanpur and Mohammad Akram of Delhi confessed that under a set plan they infiltrated into hostile religious organizations and carried out firing at mosques and Imam Bargahs.

By making mosques unsafe for worshippers, RAW aims at conveying to the world that people in Pakistan risk their lives in performing their religious obligations; in a country created in the name of Islam.

13.2 Arrest of Indian naval officer, Kulbhushan Yadav (Jadav)

A previous Indian Navy officer, Kulbhushan Jadav was captured on March 24, 2016, in a strike close to the border town of Chaman in Balochistan on the charges of undercover work. As indicated by the Pakistan government, Jadav had conceded that he had been coordinating different exercises in Karachi and Balochistan at the command of RAW since 2013. He had additionally admitted of assuming a part in weakening lawfulness circumstance in Karachi. Pakistan government authorities discharged a six-minute video in which Kulbhushan Jadav, guaranteed he is working for India's top Intel office RAW and that he is still with the Indian Navy.

Jadav have confessed that he started functioning as an intel enroll after the assault on the Indian Parliament in 2001 and that he then set up an independent venture in Iran in 2003 which gave him cover to successive outings to Pakistan before turning into a RAW specialist in 2013.

He included that he was gotten while attempting to cross into Pakistan from Iran on March 3. Despite what might be expected, India kept up that he resigned from the Navy in 2002 and has had nothing to do with the Indian government when he was captured from Balochistan.

Official sources in New Delhi rubbished the indicated "admission" and said it was Pakistan's 'advocate ploy' to redirect the consideration from its own particular issue of 'home-developed terrorism'. The Indian government, had likewise issued no less than five to six note verbales to the Pakistan remote service to get consular access to Jadav, yet Islamabad had hinted at no permitting it.

By chance, they were reports in the Pakistani media cited Pakistan Prime Minister's Adviser on Foreign Affairs Sartaj Aziz saying that Islamabad does not have enough or definitive proof against Jadav. Yet, be that as it may, the Foreign Ministry reacted saying the announcements were false, including that there was 'certain confirmation'.

According to reports, Kulbhushan Jadav was conceived on April 16, 1970, in Maharashtra. He joined the National Defense Academy in 1987 and was appointed to building branch in Indian Navy in 1991. It further strengthen the evidence of Indian involvement in terrorism after capture of **Ehsan Ullah Ehsan** a former spokesman of Jammāt ul Tehreer in Afghanistan. He narrated in confessional statement of Raw paying amounts for Terrorism in Pakistan.

13.3 Spread of Daesh (IS) in Pakistan: Recruitment of a young medical student from Hyderabad, Sindh

Very recently in Pakistan there was a joint combing operation of the Police, security and intelligence agencies in Factory Area of Lahore near Punjab Housing Society. During the operation the terrorists opened fired on them. In this encounter the forces killed a terrorist and arrested a woman along with two other terror suspects. The terrorists arrested during Lahore operation had planned a major attack in the city on Easter. Upon investigation it was found that the woman name was Naureen Leghari and she a student of the Liaquat University of Medical and Health Sciences. The family of the girl had filed a kidnapping report for her two months before thinking that she was missing. However it was found that she had left her home and joined the terrorists group of ISIS.

13.4 Active Social Media and ISIS

No group has been as successful at drawing people into its message as ISIL. ISIL's extensive reach through the internet and social media is most concerning as the group continues to aggressively employ the latest technology as part of its nefarious strategy. ISIL's messaging blends both officially endorsed sophisticated propaganda with that of informal peer-to-peer recruitment through digital communication platforms. No matter the format, the message of radicalization spreads faster than we imagined just a few years ago.

In a review by Gabriel Weimann from the University of Haifa, Weimann found that about 90% of sorted out terrorism on the web happens by means of social media. According to Weimann, dread gatherings utilize online networking stages like Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, and web discussions to spread their messages, select individuals and assemble intelligence.

Fear bunches take to online networking in light of the fact that web-based social networking apparatuses are shabby and available, encourage speedy, expansive scattering of messages, and take into consideration liberated correspondence with a crowd of people without the channel or "selectivity" of standard news outlets. Also, web-based social networking stages permit dread gatherings to draw in with their systems. Though beforehand dread gatherings would discharge messages by means of middle people, web-based social networking stages permit fear gatherings to discharge messages straightforwardly to their target group and banter with their crowd in genuine time.

HSM Press is utilizing Twitter the way online networking specialists have constantly exhorted not simply communicating, but rather captivating in discussion. Invest some energy taking after the record, and you understand that you're managing a genuine person with genuine thoughts—but bombastic, fraudulent, fierce ideas.

13.5 Dread gatherings utilizing social media

Al-Qaeda has been noted as being one of the dread gatherings that utilizations online networking the most extensively. [8] Brian Jenkins, senior counsel for the Rand Corporation, remarked on Al-Qaeda's prevailing nearness on the web:

'...While all fear based oppressor associations have sites, al Qaeda is the first to completely misuse the web. This reflects al Qaeda's one of a kind attributes. It sees itself as a worldwide development and in this way relies on upon a worldwide interchanges system to achieve its apparent constituents. It sees its central goal as not just making dread among its enemies but rather arousing the Muslim people group. Its pioneers see interchanges as 90 percent of the battle. In spite of the dangers forced by serious manhunts, its pioneers discuss frequently with video and sound messages, which are posted on its sites and scattered on the Internet. The quantity of sites dedicated to the al Qaeda-motivated development has developed from a modest bunch to apparently thousands, albeit a number of these are ephemeral.'

Known psychological militant gathering the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, additionally meant ISIS, utilizes the across the board of news over web-based social networking further bolstering their good fortune when discharging debilitating recordings of decapitations. As of November 16, 2014, after the decapitation of previous

U.S. Armed force Ranger Peter Kassig, there have now been five recorded executions of Westerners abducted in Syria.[9] James Foley, David Cawthorne Haines, Alan Henning, and Steven Sotloff are likewise among the men captured and executed by ISIS. The recordings of the ruthless executions are both posted online by ISIS, where they can be seen by anybody utilizing their own circumspection, and sent to government authorities as dangers. Posting the executions online permits the psychological militant gatherings the ability to control and cause devastation among the populace seeing them, [10] and the recordings can ingrain fear inside the Western world. The recordings are normally high generation quality and by and large demonstrate the total of the abhorrent demonstration, with the prisoner talking a couple words before they are murdered on camera.

On account of U.S. help specialist Peter Kassig, his video did not demonstrate the real decapitating act and he didn't talk any last words before the execution. His quiet and the way that the real execution was excluded in the video brought up issue about his video was unique in relation to the rest. In light of Kassig's decapitation, his family communicated their desire that news media abstain from doing what the gathering needs by ceasing from distributing or conveying the video. By declining to flow the video of the decapitation, it in this manner loses the capacity to control Americans or further the reason for the psychological oppressor group.

The Taliban has been dynamic on Twitter since May 2011, and has more than 7,000 devotees. Tweeting under the handle @alemarahweb, the Taliban tweets much of the time, on some days almost hourly. This record is, as of now, suspended.

In December 2011, it was found that the Somalia-based dread cell Al-Shabab was utilizing a Twitter account under the name @HSMPress. Since opening on December 7, 2011, the record has amassed a huge number of devotees and tweets frequently.

Not long after a progression of composed Christmas bombings in Kono, Nigeria, in 2011, the Nigerian-based dread gathering Boko Haram discharged a video proclamation protecting their activities to YouTube.

13.6 Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula(AQAP) and Islamic State (ISIS/ISIL/DAESH)

Islamic State has developed as a standout amongst the strongest clients of web-based social networking. In many regards, Islamic State took in their purposeful publicity create from al Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). In any case, IS immediately overshadowed its guide, sending an entire scope of stories, pictures and political converting through different web-based social networking platforms. A review by Berger and Morgan assessed that no less than 46,000 Twitter records were utilized by ISIS supporters amongst September and December 2014. However, as ISIS supporters frequently get suspended and after that effectively make new, copy accounts, tallying ISIS Twitter accounts over a couple of months can overestimate the quantity of one of a kind people spoke to by 20-30%.

Notwithstanding, as the November 2015 assaults in Paris illustrate, IS additionally utilizes out-dated techniques for correspondence and publicity. Lewis takes note of that the assaults in Paris speak to the kind of 'publicity in real life' which was a technique created by the nineteenth century rebels in Europe. The November 2015 IS assaults were executed without earlier cautioning, to a great extent in light of the fact that the agents met eye to eye and utilized other non-computerized methods for correspondence.

17 Chapter 3: Findings and Analysis

Out of key authors few out of all are ladies among them, Anne Speckhard, Jessica Stern, Martha Crenshaw, colleague Beatrice de Graaf Few places where the most prestigious canters are based. That's in Washington DC and surrounding area. University of Maryland, just outside the Beltway and downtown Washington, Rand Corporation, well it's in Arlington. Georgetown University, Washington based centres are among the key centres in the field of terrorism studies. Same holds for London, where quite a number of universities and think tanks are found that focus on terrorism and counter-terrorism. St. Andrews in Scotland is among the most prestigious ones. Institute in Israel, Herzliya and one in Singapore, are among the leading ones in the field of terrorism and counter-terrorism studies. Establishment of new centres after the attacks on 9/11, the Centre of Terrorism and Counter Terrorism of Leiden University is one of them. And together with the neighbours, the International Centre for Counter Terrorism, Hague is one of the new institutes that also played a good role and the same holds for a number of institutes in Scandinavia, Oslo, Stockholm, of course in Spain there's quite a lot of expertise centres in Madrid and also more

recent phenomenon is the Centre of Excellence of NATO on Terrorism in Ankara. In Australia have important centres of knowledge in Melbourne, and it is to mention one centre in the United States that has produced very interesting results and much training to people working in the field of terrorism. And that's the Oklahoma Centre for Terrorism Studies, which was established after the attack by Timothy McVeigh in 1995, which blew up a building there, killing 150 people. And one of the initiatives that came out of that attack was a centre for excellence where people realized they needed to know more about terrorism. . But good role of journals are still important today, especially in the academic world. Five leading institutes in the field of terrorism and counter-terrorism studies the field of Conflict and Terrorism, Intelligence and National Security, Terrorism and Political Violence. Critical Studies on Terrorism offers a forum for a lot of writers, authors that have a different view on the study of terrorism, and maybe in particular on the way terrorism is dealt with by states. So it's a more critical journal as the title already suggests. Perspectives On Terrorism, which is an open online journal of which I'm very much a favour, offering a platform for both many authors who can write and publish, but also a lot of readers who can freely access all these studies, interesting studies that are published in that journal.

At Pakistan, there's much attention to counter-terrorism in Pakistan and how that can help us to increase safety and security in the western part of the world, but what about the impact it has on Pakistan? What about what terrorism does to Pakistan itself? There's far much less attention to that. Now think about this statement about labeling terrorists. It is estimated that western media, society, and scholars, might be a bit biased when it comes to labeling terrorism, especially when Muslims are involved. By summarizing, we've seen that most authors in the field of terrorism and counter-terrorism studies are either based in North America or in Europe. Well this western bias has some negative implications for research and it's good to be aware of that. Hopefully this will change in the years to come. In the next video, we're going to discuss some of the practical challenges and dilemmas when doing research on terrorism and counter-terrorism.

18 Research on Terrorism: Challenges & Dilemmas confronted

One of important challenge is the lack of or an obstacle in doing research on terrorism For instance, comparative research. How can one compare your results of a study on terrorism with the results if we don't use the same definition? A lack of a definition is a problem in doing research. The second difficulty for research is the fact that

terrorism is subjective and politicized. Think, for instance, about researching counterterrorism. Then you have to rely on reports by governments, by agencies that deal with terrorism, and, of course, they have a political agenda. Their vision on terrorism might be different than yours, and you have to be aware of the fact that there is a political agenda behind it. And that has, of course, an impact on the use ability of these kinds of reports. And then there's the problem of small numbers. It's a bit difficult to explain, how can small numbers in terms of terrorism constitute a problem? Of course, we should be happy about the fact that in many parts of the world there isn't that much terrorism. But for researches it's partly difficult because it's easier and it's easier to come up with very general statements to come up with theories if the numbers are high. Then you have a lot of cases and you can say more precisely why people join terrorist groups or why they use a certain tool. This is not the case for terrorism, the numbers are low, but let's be happy about that. Number four on the list of main difficulties in doing research on terrorism and counterterrorism is the fact that these are very complex phenomena and that they're changing all the time. The terrorism and counterterrorism of today looks quite different from that of, let's say, a couple of decades ago but the most challenging problem, dilemma, the most important difficulty in doing research on terrorism and counterterrorism, is secrecy.

How to deal with the secrecy that surrounds both terrorism and counterterrorism? How about learning about the actors involved? How to understand their motivations? Why they do things, how they organize things with all that secrecy that surrounds it. Think also about names of many of these actors. We have intelligence services, but we mainly refer to them as secret services. And we have secret agents. And the same holds for terrorists or terrorist organizations. They also sometimes have names that indicate that secrecy and all that secrecy involved is, of course, a big obstacle in doing research. For instance, how to interview these people? What about the opportunities to do so, which is standard practice in social research? Well, that's very difficult in terrorism and counterterrorism studies. What about participant observation, meaning that you join a certain actor for a while, a counterterrorism agency or terrorist organization, because you want to know what's going on there.

The researcher tried to get access to files and archives, especially with very sensitive operational information. The chances to get access to this data are very small. First the researcher sent a letter to these agencies, but it's very likely that we will get a polite no as an answer. There are ethical problems. Even if one manages to get access to

certain individuals or files, you run the risk of being blamed to be one-sided, or to be too much understanding. And that mainly holds for having interviews with terrorists or alleged terrorists. Some people might not like it, might think you're unethical. And the same holds for interviewing, or working closely together with all kinds of police and intelligence organizations. There are a lot of groups of people who think that's not, you shouldn't do that. Partly, and that's related to the fifth challenge, it's partly related to the reliability and validation problem. If one interview these people or if one get access to their sources, they might try to fool you. They might give you their version of the truth, they might try to influence you, and it's very difficult, with all that secrecy involved, to validate, to really try to check that the information you get is valuable or not. It's an enormous difficulty, this secrecy, partly because it's related to ethical issues and reliability and validation. But nothing is impossible. One scholar that managed to overcome the secrecy problem is Jessica Stern, a leading scholar from Harvard that tried to answer the question why religious militants kill. And she wrote a book, *Terror in the Name of God*. And she thought that the only way to answer the question, why these people kill, is to talk to them. So she talked to prisoners around the globe that in the past at one point in time wanted to be suicide terrorists or wanted to kill others in the name of God. And she got access to these prisons. It's an enormous effort to gain the trust of these people and also the trust of prison authorities, and in the end she interviewed quite a few of them, I think showing that it is possible to overcome the problem of secrecy, but again it costs her a lot of time. But it's a great book. I think it's one of the best efforts to try to understand the motivations of people to kill others in the name of God. And here at the Centre for Terrorism and Counterterrorism of Leiden University, we've also tried to talk to former terrorists and people who allegedly recruit for the jihad in Syria. We think it's very important that you at least try to do so and, in some cases, you can be successful. At the same time we also have good relationships with law enforcement, the police intelligence community, again, with the aim to try to better understand these actors. But the secrecy involved in the work of these actors remains an enormous obstacle. In sum, there are many difficulties and challenges, and secrecy is the most important one.

19 Assessment Approaches to Terrorism

As we have military science war studies. The term says to use of force, the use of the military to literally fight terrorism. And then we have International Relations. Terrorism, at least for a long time, and in many countries, is pretty high on national political agendas, but also on the international one. And scholars in the field of international relations want to know, who puts terrorism on the agenda and why. And what impacts the fight against terrorism has, for instance, on relationships between countries. Does it lead to cooperation, or more conflict? These are just a few questions they are interested in. And then you have communication studies. Last week, we mentioned the fact that terrorism, to some extent, is a tool for terrorists to spread the word, to spread a message, to create fear, to have an impact on society. Our scholars in the field of communication studies want to know, how does that work? What is the role of the media? How and what circumstances influence whether or not a country is turned upside down by a terrorist attack. Or how do you, how can you limit, for instance, the impact of terrorism on societies. And then there's social psychology. You see a picture of a person that looks into the head of somebody. Well, I'm not sure if psychologists like that idea, and they will definitely frame their domain differently. But it is of interest to people who study terrorism. There are quite a number of books that have in their title, the mind of the terrorist. We want to know what's going on up there. How do they think? How do they behave? Are they different from you and me? Or not? Are they crazy or not? We will discuss that also later. What are their characteristics, and what about group processes? Who radicalizes, and who are not. How to de-radicalized persons. All these are issues that are of importance in the fight against terrorism, in the struggle against terrorism, and that are studied by people in the field of psychology and social psychology.

But there are many more disciplines that study the phenomena of terrorism and counterterrorism. But here's a blurb with a number of them, arranging from conflict studies to international law, public administration, police science, actually there are too many disciplines to mention them all. And there's no dominant one, but I should say that many scholars have a background in political science.

How to study and understand terrorism and counterterrorism? Where to start approaching this question? Are we going to look at the behavior of individuals? Or look at the larger picture, the world political system and how terrorism fits in. So we start very small or look at something very big. Are we going to talk to people? Approach

them? Try to interview of terrorist and people that fight terrorism? Or are we going to look at the facts? Are we going to get our data? Look at, for instance, archives?

And are we going to look at causes or the effects of terrorism? Just basic questions with different approaches, and each with different challenges and dilemmas, which we're going to focus on a little bit later.

16.1 First Approach - Rational or Instrumental Approach

So there are many different practical approaches to study terrorism and counter-terrorism, but what about the theoretical or Academic ones? Well currently there are three main approaches. The first one is the rational or instrumental approach. This approach tries to understand terrorism and terrorists as rational actions, rational actors of people that want to achieve certain political goals. And their terrorist activities, their attacks, are an instrument to that. And are often the result of a cost-benefit analysis. Here you see a picture of Martha Crenshaw, who was one of the early scholars that looked at terrorism as a rational act and looked at terrorists as rational actors.

16.2 Second Approach - Social psychologists Approach

The second main theoretical approach is that of social psychologists. And you see here a picture of Jerrold Post, who is one of the leading authors in this field, and we already mentioned some of the questions he and his colleagues like to address that are basically focused on the thinking and acting of individuals and that of smaller groups. And that's the main distinction with the rational or instrumental approach which focuses more on the wider political systems, political behavior and political processes.

16.3 Third Approach - Academic or Theoretical - multi-causal approach

Multi-causal approach is a well-defined approach as most academics would fit in that category as there is wide spread understanding that terrorism is highly complex, and that there is not one single explanation for terrorism. And if you want to understand terrorism, you'll have to look at many different causes. Well I think I would fit in that category. And I think we have to look in a wide variety of phenomenon and causes if we want to understand terrorism and counter terrorism. To sum up, there are many different ways to study terrorism and counter terrorism. There are many different disciplines ranging from political science to police studies. And there are three

main academic approaches: the rational instrumental approach, the social psychological approach, and a multi-causal approach.

20 Current scenario of Research studies into Terrorism

Andrew Silke, for instance, who in 2004 wrote a very critical book about the results of terrorism studies in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, noticed in 2009 that the field of terrorism studies is beginning to stabilize from the biases in focus in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 and the war on terror. And Magnus Ranstorp, who is affiliated with the Swedish National Defense College, expressed the need for vigorous debate, critical self-reflexivity, and alternative analytical assumptions and approaches. The third quote, more recent one, is from Alex Schmid, who amongst others is a fellow at the International Center for Counterterrorism here in The Hague. He's rather positive about latest developments. In 2011 he wrote that terrorism studies have never been in a better shape than now. Looking at these statements, and having studied other works that look into the state of the art in field of study, the following issues stand out. These are main characteristics including both strong points and weaker points, and one of them is the focus on niches. A lot of terrorism researchers look into very specific types of terrorism or modus operandi. A good example of that is the interest in terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. A lot of books, articles, reports have been published about that. But it's really not the type of terrorism that takes place most of the time. It's a very worrisome development, but some say too much attention has been focused on that. Another example is lone wolf terrorism, or lone operator terrorism.

Taking the account of the horrible attack in Norway by Anders Breivik this research has studied what motivates these people, why they do it. What can we do against it? But if we look at all incidents on terrorism, this is such a marginal phenomenon. It represents less than a percent of all attacks. Do we devote a lot of attention to these very specific types of terrorism? Second characteristic of the state-of-the-art of terrorism and counterterrorism studies is the fact that it's based on the assumption that terrorism is a very big threat that terrorism constitutes of major attacks. And if we look at the facts we see that in most countries it's not a big physical threat and that most terrorist attacks are not of the scale of 9/11, Bombay or other major events. An issue of concern is the characteristic that the state-of-the-art of terrorism studies is not focusing on comparative studies and that there's few theory testing. After

comparing the theory and practice, something that needs to be done more according to many scholars in the field of terrorism studies. Next is the issue of the selection bias to Western interests.

For example much attention to the threat posed by terrorism from Pakistan to the West and much less attention how terrorism affects Pakistan, and Pakistanis. And another characteristic is the policy oriented nature of research. There has been much research into questions that authorities have, governments have. How to deal with this threat? And much of the studies tried at least to give an answer to that by providing studies to questions that are relevant, especially in the field of counterterrorism. Fundamental question is that do we know much more about terrorism and counterterrorism than, let's say, 12 years ago? I think the answer is yes. Yes, we do know much more. But, of course, there are under-researched issues, topics that still need to be addressed.

To sum up, we do know more about terrorism. And academia think things have produced interesting assumptions on causes, mechanisms and processes regarding terrorism and counterterrorism. But we also notice there's been a lack of theory testing and the testing of assumptions, and that's not a good thing. Why not? These assumptions are very often the basis of counterterrorism policies. So if the assumptions are right, that's a good thing. But if the assumptions are wrong, maybe our counterterrorism policies are wrong. We have selected five interesting assumptions to analyses, either because they're challenged or the opposite, they're very much trusted on the basis of policy making. Now these five assumptions are the following. These are as below,

- Terrorism is caused by poverty,
- Terrorists are crazy,
- Terrorism is increasingly lethal,
- Terrorism is predominantly anti western,
- Is Terrorism successful?

It is mentioned that there are relatively few scholars from Asia, Latin America and that Africa that study terrorism and counter-terrorism. Well, Akinola, I'm very happy to have you as a research fellow at the ICCT, the International Center for Counter-Terrorism. And that you are an exception to that rule. May be one could indicate why a number

of scholars, actually from the region of terrorism where is really happening, why they are not participating in the debate as much as you might expect? What challenges do they face when doing research or when participating in the debate?

Quite rightly we have encountered a lot of difficulties in regard to data gathering. I think perhaps one of the most major difficulties; we just call on experts from the continent of Africa and countries gathering primary data from the zones of conflict. Security concerns, issues regarding fear of being attacked, but also, it's important that this data is gathered and also failing to policy formulation processes. But in addition to this, I also think that there are also quite a number of scholars from Africa that have contributed to the counter-terrorism debates globally. We have Martin Elry from Cameroon, there is Christie Anine from Ghana, and both of them have actually examined the rule of the African Union in combating and preventing terrorism on the continent. There are also institutions. In Nigeria over a decade ago there was the Africa Center for the Study Research on terrorism that was established. We have another expert who was looked at issues of extremist violence and radicalization in Nigeria by name indeed we have publication series that's produced and generates knowledge on these issues. There is the Leadership Issues in Africa series, which is currently being launched by the African Leadership Center, which is a continent wide initiative that trains young African men and women on peace, security, gender, and terrorism issues.

How can we make sure that the participation in the debate is more active, or better known to the outside world? But what else can be done to make sure that we learn more from each other? Yes, actually lots can be done. One major step that can take us forward in the process is to appreciate that unique perspective which Africa offers. In this regard, how we can challenge the conventional approach to counter-terrorism. Not just using the use of force, for instance, looking at the security-development nexus, looking at that paradigm, looking at how we can employ a blend of soft and hot power, which is all fused into partnerships and interventions involving local and external actors. I think if both parties or if both sides of the world actually cooperates in this areas it will take us much further. Is there something like an African perspective to terrorism and counter terrorism and the way to study it? Indeed there are recent events, terrorist incidents on the continent. In northern Nigeria, the crisis in the Sahel, in east Africa, Somalia, actually reinforce the need to look at the link between security and government issues. We need to address the root causes of violent extremism, which most of the time is underscored by social economic

concerns of the people. People living on the margins of society. We need to find ways, strategies and formulate policies that can incorporate them into the polity. And I think Africa and events in Africa reinforce that need the emphasis, the need to look at these realities, do you have the feeling that western partners in Europe, United States know enough? Are there enough corporations that we can learn from your experience and compare it with our knowledge of terrorism? Indeed there is a lot to learn from the western perspective. Historically a lot has been done but then Africa has also done a lot. For instance, some of the things I've mentioned regarding socio-economic concerns, root causes, structural violence issues. If you look at it critically, in Africa, there is need to look at the gender dimension. For instance, woman incorporating woman, not only are the grassroots level but also are the highest level of policy making. Events in Africa underscore the need to look at that. And I think if that can be combined with a conventional approach of western scholars, I think the input tool will produce something that is robust enough.

21 Assumptions

18.1 Assumption 1: Terrorism is caused by poverty

Terrorism is a complex and ever changing phenomenal and that requires us to update our theories and assumptions every now and then especially if they constitute the basis of policy making. The five assumptions that we're going to explore and analyze are the following. Terrorism is caused by poverty. Those terrorists are crazy or insane. And the third assumption we're going to look at is terrorism is becoming increasingly lethal, it's getting more deadly. And then we'll look at the assumption that terrorism is predominantly anti-western. And finally we're going to look at whether or not terrorism is successful as stated by some. The first assumption is about root causes of terrorism. It states that poverty causes terrorism. It is an idea that is almost as old as the first attempts to understand terrorism. Where does it come from? It should be stressed that the statement, this assumption is mostly put forward by politicians and public figures. Well, here are two examples. The first one is from the former US Secretary of State, General Colin Powell who in 2002 said the following. He said, I fully believe that the root cause of terrorism does come from situations where there is poverty, where there is ignorance, where people see no hope in their life. And the second example of somebody who states that poverty causes terrorism is the South African Archbishop Desmond Tutu. And in 2007 he said, you can never win a war against terror as long as there are conditions in the

world that make people desperate that includes poverty, diseases, ignorance. Two excellent examples of very well-known public figures who have stated that poverty causes terrorism are these eminent persons right or wrong? Is poverty a root cause of terrorism? First we are going to answer, why it is actually assumed that there is a link between poverty and terrorism. Well the basic idea is that poverty leads to a lack of opportunities to improve the quality of somebody's life. I think Collin Powell referred to that as it results in anger towards people who are better off. Or into blaming the government for the lack of these opportunities, and grievances is a keyword here. In combination with the idea that tears our rational acts. It is argued by some, that violence might be the last resort to put their grievances, their anger, and their frustration on the police who attend them. Those point effect that there is terrorism in poor countries and that's some terrorists indeed from the lower parts of society. And they subsequently assume a link between the two, a co-relation between poverty and terrorism. Finally it should be stressed that there are some terrorist organizations mainly extreme left wing organizations that claim to fight for the poor. Why does it matter? Why do we have to test this assumption? Well, obviously it has consequences for counter-terrorism measures. For instance, if you think that poverty is a root cause of terrorism, you might want to do a lot more about poverty, eradication, and of course that it's great for, for my humanitarian perspective. But you want to know it's really helpful to make the chance of a terrorist attack any smaller. But just like with many other different issues, counter terrorism policy makers are confronted with the problem of allocating scans resources such as money, time, and people. We want to know if poverty is really a root cause of terrorism or not. And we have to decide whether it is important to eradicate poverty from a counter terrorism perspective. It's important in many others from many other perspectives, but is it also helpful in the fight against terrorism. A number of examples shown are of influential people who state that there's a link between poverty and terrorism, and I could have added many more. Well, interestingly, it's mainly politicians that make that claim. Politicians, world leaders even, that are responsible for strategies and policies on important issues, such as terrorism. And the idea of a causal link between poverty and terrorism doesn't sound far-fetched. But is it true, or is it a myth? Well, let's compare the statement with empirical data and academic research.

Let us first have a look at some statistics, some examples. While studying the characteristics of individual terrorists, it seems strange to assume a direct link between poverty and terrorism. Most terrorists are not very poor, or much poorer than others. In fact, some terrorists are extremely rich. Think of Osama Bin Laden Perhaps the most well-known terrorist of our age, who came from a wealthy Saudi family. And another example is the so-called Christmas Day bomber, Umar Farouk Abdul mutallab, who in 2009 tried to blow up a plane heading for Detroit. But he studied in London, and was of a well-to-do family from Nigeria. And there are many other examples of terrorists from upper or upper-middle class. Take, for instance, Anders Breivik, who killed almost 80 people in Norway or to take an example from the 1960s and 70s that is Ulrike Meinhof, one of the key persons of the Rote Armee Fraktion. She also came from a well-to-do family, was highly educated, and had lots of opportunities in life. Studying the characteristics of Jihad terrorists in Europe I found out that they were mainly children of migrants or migrants themselves. And they were of lower parts of society. But they were not poorer than other migrants or children of migrants. And the same holds for many terrorists in the less developed parts of this world. Many of them are perhaps not rich or not even middle class but they are not poor than their fellow citizens. This has been confirmed by quite a number of studies into the backgrounds of terrorists which we will discuss in a minute. If we look at the map we see that Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Russia, and Nigeria are most often confronted with terrorism.

Are these the poorest countries in the world? Well let's take the statistics, of the World Bank, that ranked 185 states of which they gathered data. Now we see that Iraq is number 111, on that list. And it's considered a higher middle income country. And Pakistan, India and Nigeria rank between 150 and 139, and they're considered lower income countries. And Russia, number 55 on the list, is actually one of the richest countries in the world, a high income country. Well, the only country that is in the bottom part of this list is Afghanistan, but there are 15 other countries that are less developed and the ten countries with the lowest per capita. Gross Domestic Product does not experience high or even moderate levels of terrorism with the exception of the Democratic Republic of Congo. And you'll also see that Somalia is also often faced with terrorism, but the World Bank didn't have data. Well what's the situation, perhaps different in the past? Let's take the example of Left-wing terrorism in the 1960s and 1970s. It was countries like Germany, Italy and Japan that were most often hit by this type of terrorism. Well these countries, both then and today are among the richest in the world. So looking both at the individuals and at countries, there seems to be little

support for the idea that poverty causes terrorism. But the assumption deserves a more in depth look. I would like to present to you the detailed study by James Piazza, who looked at the link between poverty and terrorism from different angles on a micro level. Well, in his study, he included many variables that could directly or indirectly be related to poverty, or associated with poverty. And, these factors or variables included low levels per capita income. High levels of illiteracy, low life expectancy, and lack of employment opportunities. Well he looked closely at them, and he concluded that these poverty-related factors could not be linked to higher levels of terrorism. Two scholars that did not use indicators of poverty on a macro level, but looked at individual cases, individual lives, were Alan Krueger and Jitka Maleckova. And in there very often quoted study from 2003 they investigated the assumed link between poverty, education and terrorism. And their research found focused specifically on the militant wing of Hezbollah, the Shiite Islamic group and political party in Lebanon. Well they looked at these cases; they looked at the lives of these persons, the history of these persons, their biographies. And then found out that and I quote here, any connection between poverty, education and terrorism is indirect, complicated and probably quite weak. And they also concluded that terrorism is rather, and it shows you here, is caused by a response to political conditions and long-standing feelings of indignity and frustration that have very little to do with economics. We'll have a look at the reading list if you want to read the whole article of Krueger and Maleckova and the same holds for the other articles and reports I've mentioned. While studying the statistics and looking at the academic literature there is very little support for the idea of a direct link between poverty and terrorism. And some argued that there might an indirect link, but it's very difficult to prove. And yes, of course there might be individual cases where people are motivated to turn to terrorism because of poverty. But there is no evidence to support the idea that poverty is a root cause of terrorism. So, the idea of a closer relationship between poverty and terrorism is mainly put forward by politicians and public figures. But statistical data on individual terrorists and countries do not show a link between poverty and terrorism. And scholarly literature is quite clear about the lack of such a link. Therefore, this assumption we have to label a myth.

18.2 Assumption 2: Terrorists are crazy

There are examples of persons whose behavior both as terrorist and in court, feed the idea of crazy terrorist, Are they different from us? Do they suffer from any social, psychological disorder, or are they not that dissimilar from people who do not commit terrorist attacks? Or in other words, are they perhaps quite similar to you and me? Here you see the faces of a number of alleged and convicted terrorists, and many people have said that these persons were crazy.



Picture 1: Ted Kaczynski

First you see Ted Kaczynski, the so called un bomber, who amongst others send bomb letters to universities.




Picture 2: Anders Breivik

And then Anders Breivik, the man who killed so many people in Norway, a few years ago.



Picture 3: Richard Reid

And face of Richard Reid, the so called shoe bomber, who try to blow up a plane, with a bomb that was hidden in his shoes.



Picture 4: Khalid Sheikh Mohammed

And then Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the mastermind of 9/11, who didn't do the attack himself, but he planned it. Can he be considered crazy or not?



Picture 5: Major Nidal Hasan

Major Nidal Hasan, worked for the US Armed Forces, a psychiatrist who killed 13 of his colleagues in Fort Hood, Texas.

Were they crazy or not, are they really that much different from us? Well, I guess and I hope that many of you find it very difficult to understand how somebody can send a bomb letter knowing that people will be injured or killed or how somebody, like the case of Richard Reid, tries to blow up a plane or planned killing of thousands in New York, or kill his fellow colleagues. Often such violent acts evoke strong moral outrage that impedes us from an objective and proper analysis of the rational, and state of mind of terrorists. And because such acts are generally strongly condemned for good reasons, there is a tendency to regard these people as fundamentally different from us. Comparisons to mass murderers are easily drawn, and the same holds for school shooters. And we know that, in quite a few cases mass murderers and school shooters have been diagnosed with mental illnesses, and often times terrorists are put in that same category. The main difference between mass murderers and school shooters on the

one hand and terrorists on the other is that the former are not politically motivated and terrorists are, if we at least agree on the definition of terrorism is an instrument to achieve certain political goals.

In other words, there seems to be a fundamental difference in terms of rationality and if there is rationality in the act, and if this is regarded as part of a mechanism that is linked to some ideological idea, can you still call this act crazy, or the behavior of an insane person? I would like to stress that understanding the rationale behind these acts, doesn't mean you cannot condemn it at the same time. So understanding doesn't mean condoning and you might also want to still consider this kind of rationality as an example of crazy thinking. I mean terms like crazy and sane are subjective concepts, so are they crazy or not? It's a difficult question, difficult to define and difficult to answer, why is it, nonetheless, to answer these questions? If many terrorists indeed suffer from mental illnesses it has consequences for counterterrorism, it might require more cooperation with actors in mental healthcare. And, at the same time, it might lead to the conclusion that there is little we can do, as in every society there are people with all kinds of illnesses, mental illnesses, disorders and we cannot jail everybody just because they are not like us. And another consequence of this assumption is there is no use in investigating the motivations, the rationale of terrorists groups or terrorist individuals. I mean, there is no motivation or rationale, they're simply crazy. Well, how have scholars and experts dealt with these questions?

In the light of the rational or instrumental approach strongly rejects the idea that terrorists are crazy. Terrorism is a rational behavior making terrorists rational actors that kill to achieve certain political goals. So, they don't kill because they're crazy, they kill to achieve something and also within this second approach in terrorism studies, the social-psychological approach, there is consensus that terrorists are not crazy. Jerrold Post for instance, one of the leading scholars in the field of the psychology of terrorists and author of the book *The Mind of the Terrorist*, is very clear on the question whether or not terrorists are very different from us. He stated it is not going too far to assert that terrorists are psychologically normal, that is, not clinically psychotic. And he also said, they are not depressed, and not severely emotionally disturbed, nor are they crazed fanatics. In fact, terrorist groups and organizations regularly weed out emotionally unstable individuals. They represent, after all, a security risk. So even the organizations, they are very keen not to allow crazy people to be part of their organization, according to Jarrold Post and then Louise Richardson, she noted at a level of the individual psychologies to have long argued that there

is no particular terrorist personality and that a notion of terrorists as crazed fanatics is not consistent with the plentiful empirical evidence available. And allow me to also mention the Israeli scholar, Ehud Sprinzak, who would regard terrorists as fanatics. Yes they are fanatic, but he would also call them rational fanatics, even to describe suicide bombers. This is not to say that there are no terrorists that are clinically, psychotic to use the term of Gerald Post. And there are some scholars that have observed, mental disturbances, disorders among terrorists that are more frequent among them, then among the general population. And I would also like to stress that the lack of empirical evidence is partly related to the fact that it is very difficult to diagnose terrorists. Very few scholars have had the opportunity to interview and monitor terrorists the way psychiatrists normally can. Nonetheless, there's very little empirical evidence that suggests that terrorists are crazy, and many scholars agree on the rationality of their behavior, but more research is needed. That is why I would not label this assumption a myth, I would label it false. In sum, we have to explore the idea that terrorists are creating, and although many people find it difficult to understand the behavior of terrorists in particular that of suicide terrorists, academic research has shown that terrorists are, clinically speaking, normal. This means the assumption that terrorists are crazy is false.

18.3 Assumption 3: One can recognize a terrorist

As mentioned before that terrorism is a constantly changing phenomenon, which means you have to update, revise, evaluate not only your policies, but also theories and assumptions. Well, we're going to look into five of them, five assumptions on counter-terrorism. And they are the following. First we will investigate the idea that one can recognize a terrorist. Then, de-radicalization of terrorists is it possible or not? And then the third assumption is decapitation of terrorist groups' works. And then terrorism cannot be defeated, a statement heard quite often. And then finally, terrorism can best be managed by a so-called holistic or wide approach. One of the key problems when researching terrorism is the secretive nature of terrorists and terrorism, they work in the dark, underground, it's very difficult to study them. Well, this challenge is also a challenge to policymakers. They would like to know who they're dealing with, and they would like to discover terrorists before they strike. And a phrase that is connected to that need and challenge is the following, looking for the needle in the haystack. Well that sounds like a mission impossible, you can't find a needle in a haystack. But fortunately, there have been quite a few cases of terrorists that have been caught before they managed to strike and some have been caught afterwards based on certain clues

or signs. So apparently it's not impossible to find them. And perhaps they are recognizable. Perhaps it is possible to make a distinction between terrorists on the one hand and non-terrorists on the other, and to find terrorists out of a larger population of non-terrorists. Well the process or tool to do so is called profiling. How does it work? Profiling goes under different names, including its original, criminal or offender profiling. And there are different types of profiling. The main distinction is that between a focus on the individual characteristics of a person, versus a focus on their behavior. So personality profiling versus behavioral profiling is the necessity. And the most prevalent method of attempting to achieve a distinction between an offender, either a criminal or a terrorist, and a non-offender is to establish a set of psychological, socio-economic, physical, behavioral, and or ethnic attributes based on prior experiences. Well, in other words, indicators that tell us what a terrorist might look like, what are its behavioral or personality traits, and in what circumstances do they live and work, all together making up the terrorist profile. Often, this is followed by data mining or data searching, using various sources for what is called secondary security screening of the group of individuals with the largest number of indicators. So it's two steps. First, you look at the population as a whole, then you have a group that have quite a number of indicators, and then you're, you are going to do some data mining, data searching, trying to and hopefully getting out of it, a number of people that might be terrorists or, ideally, that are the terrorists. Well, if it works. In an ideal situation, it might offer the counter-terrorism agencies a perfect tool to discover terrorists without much prior information about this individual or group, purely based on past experiences, past experience with other groups or individuals. Obviously there's a demand for a tool that could really do this. Terrorist attacks cost a lot of casualties and property damage, and counter-terrorism measures have an impact on the lives of many and also cost a lot. Well here's a, a statement that is a good example of the demand for a tool, a mechanism to make a distinction between terrorists and non-terrorists. And it's a statement from a, a newspaper in Germany that was published in December 2010, and it said airports demand racial profiling to fight terror. And it reads, the incoming head of Germany's main airport lobby group is demanding the nation's transit authorities use racial profiling to weed out terrorists at security checks. Well, the idea is that it does not only make travelling safer but it also reduces costs. If you use your resources to try to scan and assess everyone you're wasting a lot of money a lot of time as well that could also be used on other precautionary measures. So, any tool that could help us to speed up that process or limit the time that we're waiting at airports would, of course, be very helpful. Well on top of that, most of

these measures at airports that take a lot of time that you and I might find annoying, also gives us the idea that terrorism is a big threat. And that's actually what terrorists want; they want us to believe that they pose a big threat. So there's a lot to say for any tool that could help us to reduce time, reduce cost, and also make us make it less feasible that we have to take all kinds of measures to prevent terrorism. And the example also illustrates some of the difficulties. It's talking about racial profiling, so it's discriminatory, making distinction between people with certain faces and features, and that's against the law in most countries, and for good reasons but, what about security? What if it really works? The benefits are many. Still, even if it works, is it proportional? Is it ethical? Well these are important, difficult and sensitive questions which we will look at later on. First, let's go back to and have a closer look at profiling. Where does it come from, and how has it been applied in the past? I guess the basic idea behind profiling is the perception among many that criminals and terrorists are different from us. As discussed before there's no empirical evidence that suggests that terrorists are crazy. But they could have other personal or behavioral characteristics that set them apart from non-terrorists. Well, whether true or not, it is an important explanation for the idea that it might be possible to recognize a terrorist. I would like to add that terrorists, themselves, probably think that profiling is possible. Because from the early days on terrorists have tried their best not to look suspicious, act normally, make sure that you, you're not noticed by the police or the secret services. And Jihadists or Islamist terrorists, for instance, they have used women or Caucasian or white converts or simply tried to change their appearances, their haircut, their clothes, the way they walk, all in order to not look suspicious, not fit any profile. Besides these human aspects, there is a technological side to the idea that it's possible to recognize a terrorist.

In recent years the revived interest in profiling is partly explained by the possibility today to gather, store and analyze enormous amounts of data thanks to developments in information technology and the Internet. Profiling however is far from new and there are quite a number of examples from the past, for instance, in the late 19th century the authorities wanted to know the true identity of a person who was responsible for the killing of a number of women in London. Well that person was called in the media Jack the Ripper. I'm sure that many of you have heard of Jack the Ripper, well the investigation into that case was considered by many as the starting point of criminal profiling. Another famous historical case is that of the so called Mad Bomber. In November 1940 the

workers of the Consolidated Edison building in New York found a homemade pipe bomb, and attached to it was a note and it said, Con Edison crooks, this is for you. Well more than 30 small bombs in public areas, theaters, phone booths would follow in the years between 1940 and 1956. And the Mad Bomber escaped the authorities; he eluded the investigators for 16 years. And in 1956 the investigators went to a psychiatrist called James Brussels, and they asked him to draw up a profile of the suspect, and they gave him all kinds of clues and information of their investigation. And James Brussels came up with a profiling, a profile which had many elements that were simply common sense, but he also added some psychological ideas. For instance, he said that because paranoia tends to peak at around 35, and now we're 16 years later, so he said that the suspect is probably in his early 50s. Well, his profile proved dead on, and in January 1957, the police knocked at the door of a person called George Metesky, who was arrested and confessed immediately. What do we learn from this case? Was it just a lucky shot, or is it really possible to discover criminals and terrorists, preferably before they plant any bomb? What about more recent success in profiling?

One of the early examples of both profiling and data screening is the example or the efforts of the German Federal Criminal Police Office or Bundeskriminalamt, and especially its president, Horst Herold, who in the late 1970s tried to, tried to find the terrorists of the far left terrorist group called Rote Armee Fraktion, Red Army Faction. Well, they had found out that these terrorists, they rented their apartments using a false name and in order to protect their identity they paid their energy bills in cash. So what did the authorities do, they asked for the data of the power companies to find out what person did pay their bills in cash. And then in a second phase they looked for they compared this data with the data of the registry office and other agencies to single out innocent people. And for all the others they knocked on the door of these apartments, and in the end they found this way a, one apartment, one Rote Armee Fraktion apartment and arrested one of its members. Well, I'm not sure if you want to call this success, as the efforts were huge. And looking for other examples in academic literature I soon found out that there are no clear-cut examples of successful profiling in counter-terrorism.

In fact, virtually all important studies by academics say that personal profiling is impossible. And it's clear now from the academic world; it's linked to many studies that show that there is no terrorist personality.

So terrorists are not only not crazy but they're also not very different from us, at least not different enough to make profiling possible. And even if they were very different, we would still be confronted by, well fortunately, by the fact that there are relatively few terrorists. So that makes it impossible to create enormous databases with data on individuals. What about this so-called behavioral profiling? Well again, most academics are highly skeptical as there are many obstacles to this kind of effort as well as many risks. One of the biggest risks is the possibility that incorrect information from profiling can lead to so-called false positives or false negatives. And both can have serious consequences. For instance, a false positive can lead to a situation in which a suspect who appears to fit an incorrect profile is investigated or even arrested. And the consequences could be that it blocks investigating other leads, other clues. Or it can even lead to the escape of the person or persons who are responsible for an attack. And the opposite of a false positive is a false negative. And in that case the profile might provide information that leads investigators to rule out certain groups while focusing on the wrong ones. Efforts to profile terrorists in the West in recent years have often proved to be examples of racial profiling, monitoring Muslims. And we know that not all terrorists are Muslims, as we discussed last week.

Racial profiling has also resulted in false positives and false negatives, but it also has had considerable ramifications for the individual liberties of the population being monitored.

Creating and fostering stereotypes and the notion of a clash of civilization, or a struggle between Islam and Christianity it is concluded that profiling on the base of nationality, ethnicity, race, age, gender also have negative consequences for certain groups, or relationships between countries and communities. As a result profiling can be labeled disproportional, as the enormous efforts have yield few results. There are many negative side-effects, including risks for counter-terrorism. Adding all up it seems that today profiling is regarded an impossible endeavor and it is likely to remain so in light of current research. Therefore, we label the assumption that one can recognize a terrorist by means of profiling false. More research is needed.

In sum, there is a demand for a tool to make a distinction between terrorists and non-terrorists. And there is a long history in attempts to profile criminals and terrorists. But there are no clear cut successes. And according to scholars it's, it's almost impossible to do individual profiling, personal profiling and they even see a lot of obstacles for behavioral profiling, as there are many negative side effects as well as risks for counter-terrorism. Therefore we

label the assumption that one can recognize a terrorist as false. In the next video we will explore and analyze the idea that one can de-radicalize terrorists.

18.4 Assumption 4: Terrorism is increasingly lethal

Taking an account of the assumption that terrorism has become more lethal, more deadly, in the past decades. This assumption can be interpreted in two ways. First, the number of fatalities and the total number of people being killed in terrorist attacks is observed by taking different angle by looking at individual terrorist attacks. The attacks are studied under the following questions:

- Have they become more deadly?
- Are there today more victims per attack than in the past?

It should be noted that these two sides are independent of each other, the origin of this claim or assumption can be linked to the idea that terrorism has been defining feature of our era, and that we live in a post 9/11 world. And it also rooted in the idea that the size and shape of terrorism is different, it's different now than in the past. After 9/11, it has become a very big threat, more so than in the past. Here are some examples of quotes by politicians, government agencies and scholars that hint at a new type of terrorism, one that is deadlier than in the past. According to Dick Cheney, who was then the vice president of the United States and in 2004, the biggest threat we face now as a nation is the possibility of terrorists ending up, in the middle of one of our cities with deadlier weapons than have ever before been used against us. Biological agents, or a nuclear weapon, or a chemical weapon of some kind to be able to threaten the life of hundreds of thousands of Americans.


On the other side of the globe, Australians and the Australian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in that same year stated something similar. It stated, advances in weapons technology are making them, the terrorists, more lethal than ever before, the range of weapons at the terrorists' disposal is wide and increasing. And finally, a quote from a scholar, Peter Neumann, a German scholar working in London at King's College who in 2009 said, in the era of the new terrorism, the two considerations, violence and symbolic value seem to have merged, with mass casualty attacks against civilian populations being routine and intentional.

Are these ideas and statements based on facts and proper analysis? Well, unfortunately the attacks on 9/11 and the ones in Bombay, Besilam, Baghdad and Bali, they were facts and these and other deadly attacks cost the lives of many people. So, yes they are very lethal and they made headlines worldwide, sometimes for days. Well if you add then the many threats posed

by terrorists groups to attack, including threatening to do so with weapons to be used in mass causality attacks. And also add the interest of certain groups in unconventional weapons and even weapons of mass destruction, then the idea of increasing legality becomes even stronger. And we did see in the street of Iraq, Pakistan, people that are willing and able to make more sophisticated explosives and to use them in suicide attacks. In other words, a worrisome combination of new techniques and tactics and maybe I should add different ethics and different codes, that make it possible for terrorists to kill more people and to kill more people at the same time. It was quoted Byron Jenkins, who in 1975 stated that terrorist want a lot of people watching, but not a lot of people dead, and I also said that in 2006, he rephrased that statement. In 2006 he said, the most striking development is that terrorism has become bloodier in terms of what acts are committed and how many victims are involved.

And in this publication in 1975, he described a number of constraints that the terrorist were facing at that time. These constraints included a sense of morality, a self-image, operational codes and practical concerns. In 2006, he noted, these constraints gave way to large scale, indiscriminate violence and he rephrased his famous quote from 1975. And the new quote is as follows, he says, many of today's terrorists want a lot of people watching and a lot of people dead.

If terrorism is becoming more lethal, maybe we should devote more means to fight this very serious physical threat. But what if it's not? Well, we think it is. Maybe we have spent too much money on countering it. Money, scarce resources we could have used for other important issues, such as the eradication of poverty, making the world a better place. But if terrorism is indeed more deadly, maybe we should look for tougher measures to fight it. But if it's not, maybe we should have a closer look at the proportionality of the measures we have taken in the past. Maybe it has become less deadly and maybe we have overreacted after 9/11, and other such attacks that gave us the impression, rightly or wrongly that terrorism attack has become more deadly. Myth or fact let us compare the assumption with empirical evidence. What are the numbers of people killed in terrorist attacks, and how does that develop over time? To answer that question, we use the background report, 9/11 ten years later, of the national consortium for the study of terrorism and responses to terrorism, also known as start, which is based at Maryland University.



Source: Global Terrorism Database, START Center, University of Maryland, www.start.umd.edu/gtd

Here is a graph with the number of fatalities worldwide because of terrorism in the period 1970, 2011. The numbers are pretty high in the early 1980s with 8 to 10,000 people being killed. Then it goes down in 1995, goes up again to a pretty high number in 1997 and it reaches a relatively low number just before 9/11, still greater number of people killed because of terrorism. In 2000-2001 too many, but a relatively low level. And then 9/11 that itself cost three thousand lives shows an increase but also very quickly it goes back to pre 9/11 levels, and then from 2003 on you see a gradual increase which leads to a peak in 2007, 2008 of more than 12,000 or about 12,000 fatalities in those years. But since then the line again is going downward, so what do we make out of this? What do you think yourself, how would you describe this trend? I think it can best be described as a trend with ups and downs, but you can't say that it's in general going up or down. And I think there are no indications for the future, it could go up again, it could go down even further. I think what you can say is that there is no general trend and it's definitely not one, that is only going upwards. But of course there are differences and this holds for terrorism in general, for you, for instance the trend is in downward one. But for South-Asia, unfortunately, the trend is up.

But what about the lethality in terms of the number of people killed or injured per attack? Is there a clear picture regarding this part of the assumption? Well again I would like to use the work of James Piazza who also was helpful in exploring whether or not poverty leads to terrorism, and in this study, an article of his from 2009, he explores data on victims per international terrorist attack. So, he doesn't look at all types of attacks, but he talks about international terrorist attacks, and he used the data of the terrorism knowledge base that was later incorporated in the global terrorism data base. Well, he shows that the number

of victims per international terrorist attack has increased. This data showed that in a period of 1968, 1979, they were on average a little over two victims per attack and that includes both injured and killed, and that number has gone up. In the 1980's it was almost 4, and in the 1990's it increased to over 10 victims per attack, and in the first five years of the new millennium, so between 2000 and 2005, it increase even further to almost 11 victims. Well this provides us, I guess, with a clear picture regarding locality when looking at the number of casualties per attack. Unfortunately it has gone up in recent decades. and now the conclusion, myth or fact, true or false, is terrorism becoming more deadly? We already falsified the part of the assumption that says that terrorism kills more and more people each year, fortunately, that is not the case. But the part of the assumption that says that there are more victims per attack, more people killed and injured in each incident, well, that has gone up in recent years.

Combining the two, I think we should conclude that the assumption that terrorism is increasingly lethal is partly true. To sum up, we discussed the perception, that terrorism has become increasingly lethal, especially after 9/11. This is only partly true, the number of fatalities each year has gone up and down in the past decades, only the number of victims per attack has increased significantly. In the next video, we're going to look into the assumption that terrorism is predominately anti-western.

18.5 Assumption 5: Terrorism is predominantly anti-western

Now we will explore the assumption that terrorism is predominantly anti-western. Well this assumption can be broken down in two parts. First we're will focus on the targets. Are the targets of terrorism mainly westerners or are they not? Then we look at rhetoric, is the language, are the slogans, is the discourse of terrorists mainly anti-western? Where does the assumption come from? What's the origin of the claim? Well, President of the United States George W Bush hinted at it in a speech, which he delivered about ten days after the attacks on his country in 2001 and in this speech, or his address to the nation, he said the following. Americans are asking, why do they hate us? They hate what they see right here in this chamber. A democratically elected government, their leaders are self-appointed they hate our freedoms. Our freedom of religion, speech, vote and assemble and disagree with each other. Thus hinting at an anti-western idea or an anti-western agenda. And there are many interviews with Osama bin Laden, the then leader of al-Qaeda that is proof of an anti-western agenda. In an interview with Al-Jazeera in 2002 for instance he stated that the priority in this war at this stage must be against the infidels, the Americans and the Jews who have not stopped their injustice. And also scholars and experts have pointed at anti-western talk and anti-western terrorist attacks. Well, one of them was Walid Phares, who wrote several books about what he calls, Jihadism or jihadists. And the author describes and analyzes through multiple examples of terrorist groups and individuals how jihadists

wage a war against the west, an ideological war against western civilization and democracy. Some have argued that this anti-western Jihadist terrorism, also known as Islamist terrorism, is a new type of terrorism.

Martha Crenshaw, for instance, in a book published in 2000 stated the following. She said, several recent works focus on a new terrorism, that is motivated by religious belief and is more fanatical, deadly and pervasive than the older and more instrumental forms of terrorism the world has grown accustomed to. And she also shows that this new terrorism is described as anti-western terrorism originating in the Middle East, that is linked to radical or fundamentalist Islam.

And in the same book, which was published before 9/11, Martha Crenshaw also noted that alarm over the emergence of radical Islam was heightened by a combination of factors, the resort to suicide bombing in Lebanon and Israel a general willingness to inflict mass civilian casualties, and anti-American and anti-western targeting patterns. Why is it important to test this assumption? If we continue to believe and continue to say that terrorism is predominantly anti-western, of course we will strengthen this perception. But what if it's not true? What if terrorism is not mainly aimed against the west? Then spreading the idea of anti-western terrorism is not very helpful. In fact, in that case, we'll help those who would like to threaten the west. And we will make some anti-western groups a lot bigger than they are. Moreover we might contribute to the notion of a clash of civilization as put forward by Samuel Huntington. Or we might strengthen this idea of a clash or struggle between Christianity and Islam. Again this is not a good idea when the facts do not support such a clash or such a struggle. Those kinds of friends might, for instance, influence the way we look at each other. The way we look at individuals from different cultural backgrounds. It can lead to generalization and stereotyping. And for instance, in the west it could lead to that some people might see their Muslim neighbor as a potential anti-western person as a potential enemy. And that is why we have to compare this assumption with facts. Is terrorism predominantly aimed against westerners or not? Or is it only rhetoric? Only empty threats.

Regarding the threats, it should be mentioned that there have been many calls for terrorist actions against the west. I already mentioned Al Qaeda which is of course one of the most important ones, but there are many other groups as well. But what about the facts on the ground? Do these groups mainly target Westerners? Do they mainly target the West? Well, there are many different ways to answer that question. Let us first look at a geographical approach. Here is a map of terrorist incidents, or the impact of terrorism in 2011. Well we see that the regions that suffer the most from terrorism are not in the west. The West is confronted with very low levels of terrorism. Look at North America, South America, Western Europe, Australia and compare that with the figures and the colors in the Middle East. Compare it with Iraq or South Asia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India. And in Africa, it's also mainly Muslim countries that are faced with terrorism. North Africa, Nigeria, mainly the

northern part, and also, Russia has a lot of terrorism, but it is also mainly the southern part, the Caucasus region, the Muslim part of that country. So not to West. Actually, the Muslim world is most often confronted with terrorism. And who are being killed in these attacks? In all of the countries mentioned, the overwhelming majority of the victims are Muslim. And there are many sources that confirm this, and the data are striking. Well here you have the figures of the United States National Counterterrorism Center. And in their report on terrorism 2011, they say that Muslims suffered between 82 and 97% of terrorism related fatalities and appeared 2005-2010, worldwide. And other sources show that even in Iraq, in the years after 2003, meaning in the years after the US led an invasion where there was an enormous presence of Western troops, the majority of the attacks by Al Qaeda affiliates were against fellow Muslims not against western troops. So the rhetoric may be predominantly anti-western, but the victims are Muslim not Westerners. What about the situation in the West? The few attacks in the West. Are they perhaps predominantly anti-western? According to Europol's terrorism situation in internet report 2013, there were 17 deadly victims in the European Union in 2012. And less than half of them were the result of terrorist acts by religiously inspired groups. That's the political correct term for Islamist or jihadist terrorism. They also see that there were a total 219 attacks. And they were mainly carried out in France and Spain. But they were carried out by terrorist groups that are called separatists or ethno-nationalist groups. And the religiously inspired terrorists carried out only six attacks within the European Union in 2012. And one of them was the attack by Mohammed Merah, a veteran from the fight in Afghanistan, who in and around his hometown Toulouse in France, killed several people. Thus even in Europe most of the attacks cannot be labeled anti-Western. What about North America? What about United States? According the statistics of the United States State Department for the year 2012, there were no casualties because of anti-western terrorism on US soil. So the assumption that terrorism is predominately anti-western, is it true, partly true, false or should we call it a myth? Well I guess we see a mixed picture. The rhetoric of Al Qaeda and other Islamist or Jihadist groups is definitely anti-western and these religiously inspired groups seem to dominate the current wave of terrorism. They're responsible for a high number of attacks and many victims. However, when we look at these victims or look at the targets, we see that includes relatively few westerners. The main group of victims of these attacks are other Muslim countries and other Muslims. And in the West, the majority of the attacks are linked to separatist groups. Right wing groups, left wing groups, but not anti-western groups. Therefore, I guess we can label this assumption as partly true. Or even false. Depending whether you regard rhetoric as important as people killed in terrorism. Well having said that, I think it's more appropriate to label this assumption as falsified. To sum up, the rhetoric of much of today's terrorism is anti-western but its victims are not. They're not westerners, they're Muslims. Combining these two observations, we label the assumption that terrorism is predominantly anti-western, false.

18.6 Assumption 6: Terrorism is successful

Now we will discuss that is it the case that terrorists are successful? We contributed to that by repeatedly stating that terrorism is making headlines and it's high on political agenda. That's true, and isn't that what terrorists want? Is that a success? Is it enough to be talked about in political forum? Well, I guess that's not enough, and if you take the definitions of terrorism, it very often contains the words political goals. And that's helpful when determining levels of success for terrorism. And if you agree that terrorism is an instrument to achieve certain political goals by means of violence and intimidation, the criteria should be two-fold. First, does terrorism create attention and cause fear? And then the second question, do terrorists achieve their political goals? These are relatively simple criteria to measure their success, and compared with empirical evidence; think of public opinion polls or discourse analysis, and with academic literature. And of course, there are many different criteria to measure the direct or indirect success of terrorism. Here are a few examples.

Terrorism might be called successful if they reach a high number of casualties. Or when they are perceived as powerful actors with whom a government or any other actor has to deal with, or negotiate with. Or when the terrorists avoid capture or death, and when the organization itself is able to survive. And the continuity of the organization, if they last for decades, is that as maybe not also an example of success. Well, most academics have done there, simply looked at the stated political aims of these organizations and have just looked at whether or not they achieve these particular goals. Well, I think that's too narrow. And I think one also has to look at the level of fear and media coverage. Perhaps these are not goals in itself, but they are important intermediate goals. Without that attention, without those levels of fear, the political goals will surely not come. And I would also like to add that being feared and being heard might be an important goal to some terrorist organizations on its own. Well, we'll look at that later. Let us first explore the level of success in terms of the achieved political goals of terrorist organizations. Why do most scholars primarily focus on political goals when trying to determine whether or not terrorism is successful? What can be linked to the very important rational or instrumental approach in studying terrorism? According to that approach, terrorism is an instrument to achieve certain goals, employed by rational individuals who are making some sort of cost-benefit analysis to determine their tactics and strategy. And with this line of thought, it can be assumed that terrorists somehow think that there is at least a small chance to achieve some of their political goals. Well, of course, there are other approaches. To look at the success of terrorism and our other authors will have a different take on this. This holds, for instance, for Max Abrahms, who has repeatedly challenged this rational or instrumental approach. In his publication, why terrorism does not work, he analyzed 28 terrorist organizations that are on this list of designated terrorist organizations of the United States, Department of State. Well, he analyzed these groups and his analysis yielded two distinct

conclusions. First, the groups accomplished their policy objectives only 7% of the time. Only 7% of the time. Second to the level of success depends on tactical choices, in particular target selection. And he shows that group whose attacks on civilian targets are outnumbered the attacks on military targets systematically failed to achieve the policy objectives. These findings suggest that terrorist groups are rarely achieving their policy objectives and that the poor success rate is inherent to the technique of terrorism itself. You fail if you attack civilians. That's really the bottom line. And according to Abrahms, the outcome of this study challenges the dominant scholarly opinion that terrorism is strategically rational behavior. How can it be if terrorism obviously provides very limited political return for the efforts of the terrorists? Other authors have reached similar conclusions about a lack of success for terrorists. Raising, of course, the question why do they continue their struggle if it doesn't lead to achieving political goals? Paul Wilkinson, for instance, noted that some terrorists appear to believe that terrorism will always work for them in the end, by intimidating their opponents into submitting to the terrorist's demands. But he also observes that terrorists only very rarely succeeded in achieving some of their strategic goals. And he mentioned that there are only a few exceptions. In recent history which occurred and appeared of anti-colonial struggles against the British and the French. And he gives the example of the Frente de la Liberación Nacional in Algeria, which he considers a success, but I'm not sure if you want to label that terrorism. And it appeared after that, in the post-colonial period, there's not a single case of a successful terrorism in terms of seizing control in any country. And Wilkinson says that the use of terrorism as a weapon by insurgent has backfired and alienated the local population.

Another important author that has looked into the success of terrorism is Brian Jenkins. In an article in 2006, he expresses worries over increased professionalism of terrorists and the increase in casualties caused by terrorism. But he's skeptical about their success. He observes that terrorists have escalated their violence, developed new methods of financing their operations. Exploited new communication strategies, and created new organizational models. But he also notes, they have yet to achieve their own stated long range objectives. And he calls that the paradox of terrorism. Terrorists often succeed tactically, and thereby gain attention, cause alarm, and attract recruits. But their struggle has brought them no success, measured against their own stated goals. In that sense, terrorism has failed, but the phenomena of terrorism continues, according to Jenkins. How do these findings relate to the case of Al-Qaeda? Is Al-Qaeda successful? Or is it likely to succeed in achieving a state of goals in the future? Or one of the problems is that, it's difficult to define Al-Qaeda. Are we talking about core Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, Pakistan? Or Al-Qaeda in its closest affiliates? In Iraq, the Magra, the Arab peninsula. Or are we also talking about the network of Al-Qaeda including a wide-range of organizations that somehow are ideologically linked to the organization? And what about this political goals? Well, I guess we look at core Al-Qaeda and its closes affiliates. What were or are their political goals? Well, the problem is that they are rather vague and seem to chase all

the time. They include or have included the establishment of a pan-Islamic caliphate, the overthrow of non-Islamic regimes, and the expulsion of all foreigners from Muslim countries.

When looking at these cores, I think they failed miserably at the cost of many lives of innocents from Washington to New York and from Baghdad to Riyadh and Amman. Nonetheless, Al-Qaeda has meant to drag the United States and its allies into a costly war in Afghanistan and military operations in other parts of the world. And many authorities in many countries still have to invest in countering the threat posed by Al-Qaeda, its affiliates, and its sympathizers. Despite the fact that many of its leaders have been captured or killed, Al-Qaeda is still making headlines. And this raises the question whether or not one should only measure the success of terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda by solely looking at the extent to which they have reached their stated political goals. What about high levels of fear? Or the enormous investments they force to counterterrorism? Or the fact that threat posed by terrorism is still high on the political agenda? Should that not also be considered a sign of success? And if so, how successful have terrorism and terrorist organizations been in recent years?

If we look at the success of terrorism in terms of making headlines, it's clear that terrorists are very good at that. Well, maybe I should rephrase that and say that terrorists and the media are very good at that. After all it's not the terrorist that writes the headlines, it's the journalists that do so, because there is demand for it. Because you and I expect them to do that. Well, there are quite a number of studies that have looked into the use of the word terrorism in the media and various media reports. And it shows that terrorism has indeed been making headlines almost on a daily basis in many parts of the world. And there's this study by Iyengar and Kinder in 1987 that shows that between 1981 and 86 more news stories were broadcast by the three TV networks in the United States, ABC, CBS and NBC on terrorism than on poverty, unemployment, racial inequality, and crime together. This is a study from a couple of years before 9/11, actually quite a number of years before 9/11. So in the mid-1980s, even then, terrorism was making headlines more often than poverty, unemployment, racial inequality, and crime together. And there are many other studies that have looked into media coverage in general about terrorism and, of course, the media coverage of about after 9/11. Well, in the immediate aftermath of these unprecedented attacks on the United States in 2001. The general conclusion is that the reporting of it was also unprecedented. It went on for days, and really all parts of the world were confronted with the images, the horrible images, but you have probably seen them. But also the attack on the Boston Marathon managed to make headlines worldwide even though the attack was a relatively minor one. Three fatalities, of course, three too many and there are too many injured as well. But it is a minor attack compared to terrorist instance in Iraq, Colombia, India, or other places.

Nonetheless, even on the other side of the planet, in Fiji it made headlines. And the Fiji Times reported about it and produced a lengthy article with pictures. And it read as follows, Fijians living in Boston, United States, remained indoors as authorities began investigations into two bomb blasts targeting thousands of people participating in the Boston Marathon yesterday. So, unfortunately, terrorists managed to make headlines, quite easily, even with very limited means. If you want to investigate the success of terrorism in terms of spreading dread and fear, we have to look at public opinion posts of recent years. Take for instance, the famous Gallup polls. Several times each year they have asked Americans how worried they are that they or a family member could become a victim of terrorism. And about a quarter of the Americans held this concern in April 2000, which was a decrease compared to a figure of 39% in the mid-1990s in 1996. And it then registered highs of 58 and 59% in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, in its first weeks after these events. But has then since varied between 28 and 48%. In early 2013, after the Boston Marathon bombing this number was 40%, which is still more or less the same as the level of 1996. Well, one could argue that the Americans are more or less back to pre-9/11 levels of worries over terrorism. Still a pretty high number I should say. Well, the same holds for Europe. The Euro barometer, which is in public opinion poll by the European Union, shows that a concern over terrorism also had its ups and downs in the past decade. And then it's back at pre-9/11 levels, which are significantly lower than in the United States. Nonetheless, even today in many Western countries a terrorism is among the top ten worries of its populations. Unfortunately, there are few public opinion polls outside the Western world that specifically focus on terrorism and it asks questions about terrorism on a regular basis. So what to make of all these ideas and facts about the level of success of terrorism? Well, it depends very much on your definition of success. Very few terrorist organizations achieve their stated political goals. But they do manage to attract a lot of media attention. The levels of fears caused by their actions, however, do not last forever. They gradually fade out after a few years. So, the terrorists get the attention they seek, but otherwise, they are not very successful. I think therefore that we should label this assumption as partly true.

We tried to measure the success of terrorism. We reached to conclusion that terrorist organizations are not very successful in achieving their political goals. But they do manage to attract attention and some terrorist attacks can lead to high levels of fear. Therefore, we label the assumption that terrorism is successful as only partly true.

22 Present status of terrorism

19.1 Foreign Fighters in Syria: Who are they and why do they go?

Why the phenomenon of foreign fighters is making headlines, and we looked into the historical context, discovering that the phenomenon is actually not very new. In this video, we want to look into the phenomenon of foreign fighters

in Syria. Who are these people? Why did they go there? What are they doing out there? Well, according to a number of reports, their number is more than 10,000. The Soufan Group in 2014 spoke of 12,000 foreign fighters. Well, I'm not sure about these numbers. They're, they're estimates. And many say that in the summer of 2014 and the fall of 2014, these numbers have gone up. Well, here you have some other figures. 60 to 70% are believed to be from the Middle East, many from neighboring or nearby countries. And 20 to 25% are from Europe, other Western countries, and Russia. Well, Peter Neumann of the International, of the International Center for the Study of Radicalization in London in September 2014, talked about 3,000 people from Tunisia. That's the, the country that provides most, or provides, or where most foreign fighters are from. And then about between 1,200 to 2,500 are from Saudi Arabia, 1,500 from Morocco, 1,500 from Jordan. And then 700 from France, 500 from Britain, 400 from Germany. Well, you can read it yourself. 300 from Belgium, 130 from the Netherlands, and about 100 from the United States. Well, add to that dozens from Australia, also countries like Philippines and Indonesia, making it a really worldwide phenomenon. There are 800 from Russia, mainly from the Caucasus region, Chechnya and more than 100/ 150 from Scandinavian countries. Well, allow me to focus on, mainly on those that are from my part of the world, the European Union. We've done research into this phenomenon, so I can say a little bit more about these people than about foreign fighters in general. Well, what do we know? Well, they're mostly nationals from the EU countries, few residents, few refugees, but mostly nationals that are born and raised in these countries. So these are Britons, French, Danes. They are from these countries, born and raised in these countries many ethnical backgrounds, many from Morocco, Turkish background, Algerian background and also relatively many converts. Some statistics speak as, speak in, and from Germany speak of 14%. Look into the numbers in my own country that seems like a similar number. So one out of seven, maybe even more, are converts. They're mainly young men, but also women, a few older men, older persons, and according to Peter Norman again, ten of 20% percent of those who go to Syria are women. Why do they go? Why do people that were born and raised in European countries go to Syria? Well, one way to study it is by making a distinction between push and pull factors. Well, pull factors are factors that make Sy, that explain why Syria's attracting these people, and the push factors are factors that might explain why people want to leave Europe for Syria. Let's first look at the pull factors. There are many different categories. The first category is doing something good, a purpose in life, feeling responsible to protect poor people that have, are being attacked by the Assad regime, children, women, etc. And

many claim they are going there, especially when they're returning, the authorities ask them, you know, what have you done there? Their answer is I went there to help people as Humanitarian aid. Well, some do. But we know that many of them are involved in the fighting. It's also being used as an excuse, as was used in, in the case of Afghanistan in the past. But many fight for what they believe is right to help people. That brings me to a second category, the religious motivation. Some do so and they just don't mention women and children, but they, they say I do this to protect and it's my duty. From a religious perspective, my duty to protect the Ummah, the community of believers, the women and children and others in Syria. Add to that the idea to be part of the establishment of an ideal state based on religion, under Sharia law that is linked to the concept of a caliphate, a new Islamic, large Islamic state for all Muslims that covers the entire Muslim world. Also, a religious motivation is to be part of a radical change in the Middle East. The prophecy that now it's the end of the old times and the beginning of something new, an ideal new world under the black banner as used by groups like Islamic State. So the prophesy is also a pull factor. Then a third category of factors of reasons why people are attracted to join the fight in Syria, and that's comradeship, group processes. And in week two, we discussed that, the social psychological approach, and we refer to an article by Max Abrahms **What Terrorists Really Want. And he discovered that this comradeship is very important as well. Well, we also see that in the case of Syria and those that go to Syria. And then the violence, thrill and adventure as such is also a pull factor. Some people want to experience something exciting, and they even go there because of the killing. And then a final explanation of pull factor is the possibility, if you believe in this, to, to go to paradise, to die as a martyr. Well, then the push factors. We came across a number of these push factors while doing research on**

In the light of the Dutch cases people who went to Syria, together with Daan Weggermans and Peter Grol concludes some concrete examples of life stories of those people that went to Syria. While studying this, we discovered that many had personal problems, failures in life, traumatic experiences, as well as trouble with the authorities, trouble at school. And from literature, we know that also socioeconomic and sociopolitical situations or sociopolitical climate has to be mentioned as a possible explanation why people leave European countries. They don't feel at home, don't see any opportunity there, feel discriminated, marginalized. That might be another push factor why people go to Syria. In our research, we found little evidence of that, and apparently we need to do much more

research into these factors that might help us explain why people go to places like Syria. To sum up, in this video, we looked into the phenomenon of foreign fighters in Syria, and we saw that they're from different countries and that there's no archetype foreign fighter. They have different backgrounds and they go there for different motivations. In the next video, we'll look into the different groups that are active in Syria.

19.2 Fighting Groups in Syria

We discussed the phenomenon of foreign fighters in Syria. Who are these people and why did they go? And, in this video, we'll look into the groups that these people join. Well, there are many different groups, and that's, that's together, have a fighting force of maybe around 100,000, different estimates, somewhere between 75,000 and 115,000 rebels. So these people that fight against the regime of Assad. And of these fighters, about 12,000 are foreign fighters, probably more. So where did these foreign fighters go to? What groups did they join? Well, the three most noteworthy are the Free Syrian Army, Jabhat al-Nusra and Islamic State, also known as Islamic State in Iraq and Syria or Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham. The Free Syrian Army. It was founded in 2011 by officers and soldiers that defected from the army of the regime of Assad. It has a secular outlook and it has a lot of international support. Some governments have said that Assad is not the representative of Syria anymore and said the opposition is the legitimate representative and the Free Syrian Army is its army, is its military wing. And, again, it has support from a number of countries, not all countries, not Russia, not China but from another, a number of countries. And our goal is, like all the other opposition groups, to bring down the regime. And its members are mostly Sunni Arabs but also it has a lot of other groups. A lot of other ethnic and a lot of other religious groups among its ranks. The problem is it has been badly organized and badly supplied. There's a lot of internal division and therefore it's never been a very effective fighting force. That's the reason why it lost a lot of support. Many defected to Islamist or Jihadist groups like Jabhat al-Nusra and Islamic State. Jabhat al-Nusra. Also known under the name the Support Front for the People of Sham. Sham being the name for Syria. So the Support Front for the People of Syria. And it was founded in 2012. It's linked to al-Qaeda. It's recognized by al-Qaeda central, so al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, Pakistan, as a local affiliate of al-Qaeda. And it's got an al-Qaeda-ist agenda. It's also fighting the Assad regime, but more on religious ideological grounds. And its goal is not only to topple the regime, but also to create an Islamic state in Syria and a caliphate in the Levant. The Levant meaning that now is comprised of the territories of Syria, partly Turkey, small part, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, and the Palestinian territories. It's been

designated a terrorist organization by a number of countries, among them the United States, but, more importantly, it's on the UN list of terrorist organizations. Its tactics and modus operandi include suicide bombing and it has clashed in the past with many other groups, including, the Free Syrian Army and Islamic State. Among its ranks are many Syrians but it also attracted a large number of foreign fighters, including foreign fighters from Europe. Hundreds of them went to Jabhat al-Nusra, but also, recently, hundreds defected to other groups, mainly Islamic State, including the foreign fighters. Islamic State, also known as Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham, al-Sham being the name for Syria. And so it's Islamic State, of Iraq and Syria, currently under the name Islamic State. Okay, what is Islamic State? That's a, a difficult question to answer. It's an insurgent group, it's a rebel group, it's a terrorist group. It's on the UN list of designated terrorist organizations. But it's much more. In many ways, it is also a state, controlling large swathes of territory in Syria and Iraq, which they conquered in, the summer of 2014. It runs bakeries, schools, hospitals, organizes public facilities. So it's got many different faces. It is composed of foreign fighters, many of them joined, Islamic State, but also local Iraqi, sometimes Syrian, tribes, rebels that resist the central government either in Damascus or in Baghdad. So it's, it's a network of organizations with sometimes different agendas, all under the same name, Islamic State. And if we add to that, for instance, their outreach through propaganda, which is very professional, you could even say it's got supporters globally from Australia to the Netherlands and from Morocco to Chechnya. And, in that sense, it's almost also a social movement. So it's got many different features, many different ways you could define it. It makes it very difficult to actually say what is IS. Much clearer is, to describe its leader that is Abu Bakar al-Bagdadi, who managed to merge several groups into this, militant group. And he tried to merge this group even with Jabhat al-Nusra, which we discussed earlier, in 2013. But that was rejected by Jabhat al-Nusra, but also by al-Qaeda itself. So the al-Qaeda leadership, Al Zawahiri, rejected IS as an al-Qaeda affiliate.

Its goal is to establish an Islamic caliphate, which it, which it did in June 2014 and its goal is not only fighting the Assad regime, but also that in Baghdad, and also fighting other opposition forces. And the opponents are almost everybody who disagrees with them. Well, after conquering many of the territories they, that are under IS control, now we've seen lots of atrocities. Lots of killings, beheadings of local groups, of American journalists, aid workers, many different people. So it's well known for its brutality. It's, at the same time, a very effective fighting force,

fighting Kurds, other groups, and conquering more lands. So it's a, it's a huge challenge. It's, for instance, a challenge to al-Qaeda, who is the number one Islamist Jihadist movement or organization in the world. Many would say it's not al-Qaeda anymore, it's IS. And, of course, it's an enormous challenge to the countries in the region, to neighboring countries, and to countries that support these countries like the United States. And these countries, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the United, United Arab Emirates, et cetera, together with the United States, European countries, Australia have formed a coalition that is actually now fighting IS from the air since September 2014. What are these people doing out there? Those who joined Jabhat al-Nusra, Islamic State, or Free Syria Army and the many other groups. Well, here's a list of relevant activities. One is being bored and waiting. Warfare is not 24/7 at the front, so many are bored and waiting for what's happening. Many have, been involved in training, sometimes basic training, sometimes more sophistic training, and they're involved in guard duties and help behind the front lines. And, of course, there's the fighting. Fighting with sniper rifles, all kinds of weapons, heavy weapons, Kalashnikovs, anti-tank rockets, et cetera, et cetera. And, unfortunately, there's also many that are involved in war crimes. And some even go as far as to be part of suicide attacks. Well, that's the warfare part. Propaganda's also very important. Many of them are very active on social media trying to recruit others or to, make sure that people donate money for the fighting. So propaganda is an important element as well. And, of course, back home when they are questioned by the authorities, they say, I went there to provide humanitarian assistance, and it should be stressed that some do, but many do so next to the fighting. To sum up, we looked at three groups that have attracted many foreign fighters, from Europe and other places. The Free Syrian Army, Jabhat-al-Nusra, and Islamic State. And we have seen that they have different agendas and some are more radicals than others. We've seen that many foreign fighters went from, one organization to the other and ended up in the more radical ones, Jabhat al-Nusra and especially Islamic State. These more radical or extremist organizations have a wider agenda, not only to topple the regime, but also go for other, have other goals as well. To establish an Islamic state or even a caliphate in the region or beyond the region. In the next video, we will look at foreign fighters as a threat. Are they a threat, yes or no, and to whom?

19.3 Foreign Fighters: A Threat?

What is the actual and potential threat posed by foreign fighters, and how do they pose a threat and to whom? And the focus is on Europe because we got relatively a lot of information about threat assessments in Europe. And we got a little bit more information about how and why they could pose a threat in countries within the EU. Well, the idea that they might pose a threat was made public early 2013, when a number of European Intelligence Security Services. Publicly sounding the alarm bell over the increase in, in numbers of people from Europe that went to join the fight in Syria. Well, here are a number of quotes of people that expressed their concern. Let me start with the report by Europol, the Terrorism Situation and Trends Report 2014. In this report, returning fighters, it says, have the potential to utilize their training, combat experience, knowledge and contacts to for terrorist activities inside the EU. And Germany's Minister of the Interior feared that Syrian. Jihadist veterans returning to Europe after being trained in what he called deadly handwork will be, again a quote, ticking time bombs. While these are very worrisome expressions. By, especially the administer of the interior of Germany, but also Europol director Rob Wainwright. Said returning fighters could incite others to join the armed struggle. Or use their training, combat experience, knowledge and contacts to conduct violent activities within the borders of the EU. But it's not only European leaders of police organizations, intelligence organization that express concern. What about the worries of those responsible for security in countries of origin outside Europe? Well, let's take the case of Tunisia. They got 3,000 foreign fighters that are active in Syria and Iraq. It's the largest contingent actually, and relatively small Tunisia has as many foreign fighters as there are from the European Union. And that country worried as expressed by the Tunisian interior minister, who in February 2014 said the following. We said, we have managed to prevent nearly 8000 people from going to Syria. And we don't have exact numbers for those who have returned but they are estimated to number around 400. So, a relatively large group. And he's worried about, and expresses it in the following way. He says, we're following them very closely. We have built up a database. And they have a quiet experience in training and must be monitored. So, worries also in countries like Tunisia, and neighboring countries of Syria and, and Iraq, from which many countries have left to, to join the fight. Why is this the case? Well, most of them have joined jihadist groups, related to or inspired by al-Qaeda. And their agenda is more than just trying to assist local groups to topple the regime of Assad. Some, and, and actually, many of these group have a wider agenda, they want to establish an Islamic state. One who's borders are not the borders of Syria, but a

larger area. A Caliphate, which might include also ideally, Jordan and many other parts of the Islamic world. So especially, for the countries in the region this is very worrisome. But some of these groups have, have a wider agenda in the sense that they also want to punish or attack powers that support what they call, Infidel or corrupt regimes, including countries like the United States. And many also have on their list Israel as an enemy that has to be defeated. So, there are many countries that are worried about what's going on in Syria. Well, if you look beyond the agenda of the jihadist groups and focus on the individual level. The worries of governments of the countries of origin pertain to the following issues. And as we mentioned already by some of those that I've quoted. And that's the further radicalization. Combat training and experience them being part of an International Jihadi Networks. So, some of them go as individuals, but they come back as part of a larger network and some countries fear that they are being sent home to stage an attack. Also, it's been mentioned very often that, they might have a very important role in propaganda and recruitment of new people going out there to fight. And then it's more of a second order of effect or an indirect effect. It has been mentioned that governments are worried about potential problems related to possible high number of traumatized returnees. Many of these people have gone to Syria unprepared. Have seen horrible things. Have maybe participated in horrible things. Or were bystanders. And they might be fall victim to post traumatic stress syndrome. That could lead to all kinds of violence, depression, suicide. And other worrisome developments that might occur only later on. Very difficult topic of Post-Traumatic Stress Syndrome, but the traumas could be lead to second order effects apart from threats from returning foreign fighters. Many countries of origin are also worried about support groups in their countries. That supports the, the jihad in Syria and other places from their homes by way of financing it, or recruiting people, or being part of the propaganda machine. And also they're worried about the possibility that these groups will further radicalize and accept. Intimidation of violence as a legitimate instrument against the government, perceived unbelievers or not good Muslims is included. For instance, those who speak out, against the jihad and especially, against IS or against other groups. They're also worried about the Sunni/Shia clashes within their countries. But also think of polarization within society because of what's happening in Syria and Iraq. These horrible pictures that of people committing murder in the name of Islam. And it real, it leads to a lot of anti-Muslim feelings, and of course doesn't make the situation of Muslims in non-Muslim countries any easier. And we have seen this also in the town of The Hague where we, where youngsters have been waving the IS flag and have congratulated IS with the, the conquering of Mosul, the city in Iraq. And at

the same time we've had demonstrations of right-wing groups that strongly reject the idea of. Or, or this perception of Islam taking over certain neighborhoods. So we've seen already these clashes. Call them clashes of civilization at the local skill, but they are important as well and worry a lot of local officials. Well, if I have to look at the threat post by foreign fighters to countries of origin, I see that many home countries have a very home-centric view, a too home-centric view. The folks have mainly only returning four and five and I think that's too narrow. It makes sense because these governments are primarily responsible for the security in their territory jurisdiction. But I think their citizens cause serious problems outside these countries. In Syria and Iraq. And they are part of, of, of war crimes in these countries and the presence of these foreign fighters makes future settlements far more complicated. And they've threatened aid workers, they've threatened journalists. And they are a threat to stability in the region as a whole. And finally, many foreign fighters will not return to their countries of origin, partly because their passports have been taken away. For many reasons, because they fear prosecution. So, they go to other countries and might one day settle down somewhere, hopefully, peacefully. But they also might move on to the next fight, continuing this violence in the region. So, we have to be very worried about that as well to summarize the threat post by foreign fighters. Well, there are many different ways to look at it. It's, it's a huge, they have a huge impact in Syria and Iraq but they also have an impact on primarily the social peace and inter-group relations in their countries of origin. And allow to me to add and stress the fact that have caused a lot of death and misery in Syria and Iraq. And yes, there has been incidence and attacks in countries of origin. But if you compare the two, the deadliness of this phenomena is in Syria and Iraq. Well, and I, if I have to sum up the threat posed by foreign fighters to the countries of origin I would not stress the physical impact but I would stress the impact on social peace and inter group relations. In the next, video we will explore some policy options. To deal with the very complex phenomenon of foreign fighters

23 Policy Options

What can the world do about the threat posed by foreign fighters? Well, in week four of the course we discussed the need and opportunities, and also the obstacles of a holistic or comprehensive approach. And we came to the conclusion that it's easier said than done but looking at the situation in Syria, Iraq and elsewhere, doing nothing is not an option. We have to do something. We have to learn very quickly to deal with the threat posed by foreign fighters and other groups in these areas. We need an answer. Doing nothing is not an option. And in this video, we

would like to see if the UN strategy could serve as a guideline. Well, what does this UN strategy look like? What measures does it consist of? Well, basically four types. The four, the first type of measures are measures, to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism. And a second set of measures are measures to prevent and combat terrorism. The third category is measures to build states' capacity to prevent and combat terrorism, and to strengthen the role of the UN system in this regard. It consists of a set of measures to ensure respect for human rights for all. The rule of law as the fundamental basis of the fight against terrorism. Let us have a look at each of these categories, the first category, measures, to deal with the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism. What do the UN documents say about this? Well, they have a long list of, individual measures and I think these three are among the most important ones. First, to promote dialogue and tolerance and prevent defamation of religion, religious values, beliefs and cultures. Well, that's very important. In the previous video, I mentioned the indirect impact of foreign fighters and what's happening in Syria and Iraq on intra and interfaith relations. Also linked it to what some believe to be a clash of civilizations, anti Muslim feelings. Now, we have to be careful about that. And measures to promote dialogue and debate and tolerance might help to limit that impact. Then the second issue. To ensure for realization of the development goals including the Millennium Development Goals. They relate to. Poverty, health larger issues like that, social economic issues. Well, in week three we discussed the link between poverty and terrorism. And I believe there's no direct link. But the UN thinks that these larger conditions, these conditions which relate to health education and poverty. There is a link with terrorism. And they believe that in the long run, it might lead to less terrorism. But it's not a short term measure. Then to scale up cooperation and assistance in the field of rule of law, human rights, and good governance. And I think the letter is very important. The good governance element. We should do more about that. If you look at the Arab Spring, Arab Uprising, Arab Awakening in many of these countries, they were related to a lack of good governance if you could say that. And also in Syria, the Syrian uprising is linked to that and if we could do more about good governments in, many of these countries to deal with corruption etcetera. That in the long run might have an impact as well lead to less terrorism. Then measures to prevent and combat terrorism. Four issues stand out, refrain from facilitating and financing or tolerating terrorist activities. Well especially the financing part is important. Many believe that IS got a lot of support from a number of countries and a number of individuals, in the past, and that made it possible for this organization to grow and become very strong. And recently, a lot of policy makers and governments have

said, we have to stop this. And that could even have an impact on the medium term. Then to ensure that territories are not used for terrorism training camps or the preparation of terrorism acts. Well of course that makes a lot of sense. And if you could do more about that that could even have a short term impact. Then to ensure the apprehension and prosecution or extradition of perpetrators of terrorist acts. So apprehension and extradition. I believe that's very relevant in the case of foreign fighters. Many of them of course don't fly directly into Syria or Iraq but cross many different borders also the, that of neighboring countries. These neighboring countries face a lot of troubles with, with refugees but they might or they could do more in apprehending foreign fighters preventing them to cross the border into Syria. And extradite them to their countries of origin. Again that's also easier said than done. But more is needed in this field. And then finally to combat illicit arm trades that makes a lot of sense. Of course we have to do more about that. Again that could have even a short term or medium term impact. Then measures to build state capacity and to measures that relate to the role of the UN. Well to contribute to the capacity building programs in the area of port and civil aviation security is an interesting measure, especially in relation to civil aviation security. In the last months and last year groups like Islamic State and other groups have again threatened the airline industry. Which worries a lot of people that fly. And more could be done, could be done to improve security. Perhaps not in a number of countries but in some other countries. We could do more to make that even safer. And then, to encourage frequent exchanges of information and technical assistance among bodies dealing with counter terrorism. A lot could be learned from different countries can learn a lot from each other. Best practices, but also worst practices. And the best way to learn is not to find out yourself what you do wrong, or what is successful, but to sit around a table and to share ideas, experience, etc. That could have some impact on the medium term, and then to cooperate with other organisations such as the World Bank. Think about think of money laundering, and terrorism financing, and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime. Then the final category. The measures to ensure respect for human rights, and rule of law. Well some of the measures mentioned, or the issues mentioned in the UN strategy. Are you could say a good advice to governments. To to make sure that there's effective counter-terrorism policy. But that these counter terrorism measures and the protection of human rights are not conflicting goals. But complimentary and mutually enforcing. They go hand in hand. It's not. Human Rights, or security but they have to they are one of the, of the same. You cannot have a lot of security while not respecting human rights. And then counter terrorism measures need to comply with international law. And a final point I would like

to make. Perpetrators have to be brought to justice. And I think if we see the images, the horrible images in Syria, and Iraq and many other parts of the world. I think the family of the victims and the victims themselves need to know, and be sure about the, the idea that their perpetrators will be brought to justice. How to translate these ideas into concrete measures and to implement them effectively. Well, this is difficult, and takes us back to week four, where we discussed, the pros and cons, the possibilities and obstacles. To a comprehensive or holistic approach. And we said it's easier said than done. And this is also the case with regard to the UN strategy. But nonetheless, it's highly valuable for a long term approach. But in the short term, it will not stop the fighting. And it will not immediately stop the flow of foreign fighters going to Syria and Iraq. Today the military option is the predominate one. And also that will not bring the solution. Might have an impact on the short term, but it will not be the solution. Ideally, we would find a proper mix between short term measures and long term measures. That also focus on the conditions that led to the rise of groups like Islamic State, Jabhat al-Nusra, and other groups. To sum up, there are several theoretical options to deal with foreign fighters. And the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy lists a number of these measures in four different categories. But the problem of these measures is that they mainly relate to the medium and long run. And in the short run, there are fewer options. And this means we should not expect any solutions soon. And as many have already indicated, the situation in Syria and Iraq will not be solved in a few months time. It will take years, unfortunately.

24 Hangout on Islamic State & Foreign Fighters (March 2015)

Sample: Cynthia, or Efrat, Louisa, and Darren.

21.1 Introduction

First, Jason who's from Canada who has a background in law enforcement, a background in police studies, criminal justice as a career, or as a career in, in policing 12 years, 4 years in the Canadian army. The second participant is Efrat Hussein, who is from, was born in San Juan, Puerto Rico, residing in the state of Tennessee in the US, graduated, in 2007. Paralegal studies at the City University of New York, an entrepreneur with a background in transportation, so, interesting different background.

The third participant is Louis who is, one of the course, or the forum moderators, a Dutch student in international relations from a, in historical perspective at Utrecht University. Janine has also graduated from that same, excellent, study here in the Netherlands, and has a bachelor's degree in, in history, writing her thesis on European counter terrorism policy in the 1970s.

The fourth participant is Darren Begley nationality says Scottish doing masters international education part time working.

21.2 Question

To what extent was ISIS created in response to anger and frustration at the policies pursued by Western governments? And, by western governments, I mean, like, the United States, the United Kingdom. And to what extent can we say that ISIS is such a threat that it currently is today, because of the actions of, of these governments?

21.3 Answers to Question

Darren: A sensitive one to a lot of policy makers in the West but one that is raised, not only by a people with Muslim background but people in the West as well. This, again this sensitive issue, especially from U, US perspective I guess, he said a few days ago in an interview with Vice News he said two things, one is ISIS is a direct outgrowth of al Qaeda in Iraq that grew out of our invasion. So he, he assumes a causal relationship between these two things and he also said in that same interview which is an example of unintended consequences, which is why we should generally aim before we shoot.

Efrat: I have to believe that this is biased because the issue that a, a foreign country invade another country to not give any motive to evolving to violence and to attack country in a name of a religion which is, doesn't, or never have promote violence against another country. I do believe that maybe it's an excuse that they are using, with the sole purpose to commit these crimes against other humans and basically try to enforce their doctrines and their beliefs to other people that do not share the same the same religion or the same doctrines. I think that, it's a double standard in this. It might seem like it's a response, but personally, as a Muslim, I do not believe that it's a response.

Luisa: I think Western Governments may have cost the created the conditions for IS to arise in this region but it is always well this is my opinion from a moral perspective. That it is always the choice of IS and the fighters over there to choose violence. And even though the Western governments didn't make it any easier for them in the region and de, destabilize the region very much. It is still the choice of the people that use violence or not, so. Yeah, partly the Western governments are to blame. That's still I think the problems over there are more complicated than that. Also, we have a lot of sectarian issues over there. So, it's not only the Western world to blame. So, that's my point of view.

A lot of people blame that same Western government for not, in-, invading Syria and getting rid of the Assad regime. So, there's always, there's, there's problems. Should you do something, you're damned if you don't, you're damned if you do or the other way around. An unintended side effect but it's definitely I think a good thing. That he at least hinted at the fact that, that we, the West are partly to blame for the situation over there. And maybe I understand that, also motivation to continue to make sure that we don't leave these people alone. And try to help them to create stability, while really thinking of all the possible negative, consequences of our presence over there.

Darren Further adds: The way I sort of see it when I look at it, is that, the, the whole growth of ISIS and its s, strength, has sort of been born out of over aggressive foreign policy towards the Middle East. Maybe, to the extent, like, the, the, the growth of ISIS has kind of, like, maybe, liked the Frankenstein of this policy. Of, its pursuit of how it behaves in the Middle East. And yeah, perhaps maybe as Efrat said, some, maybe some people will use this as an excuse. Some people will use it as the, as an excuse to justify the, the violent actions. But, I would also suggest that, and, and, and the argument to that. I think that when, when we see such aggression from, from the United States, and from Britain, and from out other allies in, in the Middle East. Many people will, I would believe are sort of left with a feeling of frustration. And they have no other way to, to express their, their opposition to, to what's happening. Maybe they don't feel that they, they are represented by the, the governments, which have put in place. So well, I understand that yeah, might be an excuse for some people to, to justify the use of violence. I, I think that to an extent there has to be an element where you have to sort of suggest that I, I think maybe some people are, would maybe not, maybe people are not violent per se. But people maybe, some people in the country are, in these countries would, would support ISIS. Because they feel, there's no other way to represent their desire, or their

will, or their agenda, maybe is a better word. So maybe they don't really wish the violence to be continued at such an extreme rate. But they feel maybe they have nothing else to, no other way to express support for their, their beliefs, maybe.

Researcher: Of course it, it depends like how you want, how you want to raise your issue on the agenda. And, and using this type of violence IS is using of course is, I think and I think we can all agree unacceptable, outrageous. And maybe then I'll move onto Jason, your question also relates or starts with this committing of war crimes. The way IS is behaving in the region, in Syria, in Iraq. Today, they actually said that they were behind the attack in Tunisia that killed about 20 people. And they were very proud that they did what they did. And this is not only unacceptable to the West, but also many other countries face this problem. And your question relates to also to IS, so Jason may I give you the floor. I cannot see you anymore, but I hope you're still out there.

Hoping that he will, pop up and he will he will hear us. So Jason was asking, since IS has been accused by the United Nations of committing war crimes, on a massive scale. And there has been, has been allegations that similar acts have been committed by other factions involved in this conflict. Would it not be appropriate, at this point, for the United Nations or similar coalition of nations to commit additional forces? So currently, we have these air strikes. And so aside from air strikes and special operation advisors currently on the ground. In an effort to finally bring stability to that region and prosecute those responsible for the atrocities committed. So the idea of boots on the ground.

21.4 Question to Louise:

What do you think of the idea that we should step up the let's say kinetic or military approach towards IS? Since they continue their atrocities not only killing people but also that this archaeological genocide. Destroying age old buildings that are so much part of, of world civilization. What do you think?

Lousie: Well I think we, or the United Nations has to do something. The coalition of the willing is starting to do some air strikes and things. And I think that's not sufficient enough to, well let's put it harsh, destroy IS. I think we have to step up and help people. And that means we have to put boots on the ground as well. And not just staying out of the region or led it over to the partners in the region itself like Lebanon, stuff like that. We have to I think it

is, as a liberal country, it's more like liberal perspective in international relations. We have to live up to the human rights we have. And what's the point of having all these conventions in human rights if we don't act on it. So yes, we have to take responsibility and do something whether it is boots on the ground or not.

What they are doing now is not sufficient enough, the coalition of the willing of course, not the UN. But I think they have to step up.

Yeah, our responsibility is to protect. That seems like an empty phrase now. That was a big word ten years ago and now we see these things happening. Acts committed, crimes committed by IS. At the same time, we see crimes by the Assad regime, and we're just standing there saying, oh, okay, our responsibility to protect. At the same time, Darren mentioned the fact that, a lot of people realize that western military interventions, or what, whatever military interventions can also, in the long run cause new conflict. So, Jason, great you're back. Actually I erased your question, excellent question. Maybe I, maybe I'll give you the floor to maybe partly answer your question, yourself. Or your first reaction, and then, go to Efrat to see what is her take on that. So Jason thanks for the question we had a first reaction by Louisa so maybe now back to you. >> Thanks sir, sorry about that yeah just a little bit of technical difficulty on my end. Anyway yeah no, I brought that up with the, with the UN it was base, based on something I'd read the other day. Regarding, you know, atrocities committed in, in, in the, you know, in, in Iraq and Syria. And it kind of ties in a little bit with the response I'd wanted to give to Darren's question regarding the measured response.

Okay, maybe IS is, is reactionary to you know, what they're doing, you know, to, you know. They're reacting to what, you know, the West's intervention in that region. However what they're doing is not a measured response to, you know, like it's, it's not, it's not proportionate. And it, at this stage in the game, I mean it's not even about you know, a Caliphate, it's not about Islam. It's violence for the sake of violence. I mean, we're reading about people being beheaded, we're reading about pep, you know, pilots being set on fire. I read one dreadful story the other day about a woman who was tricked into eating her own son. I mean, that's terrible, that, that's, so we have to do something. And, I mean, I also read that there are other factions on the ground that are committing, you know, similar atrocities. I read that Iran is now being involved. Are we going to hold Iran accountable to the same rule of law that we, that you know, and, and are we going to indict them the same as we do IS? Or are we going to, you

know, like when are we going to run interference and and, and you know, ensure that things are done right? I'm, I'm really curious about that because it seems like a lot of talking is being done. And not a lots being you know, being done to you know, like there's nothing we see, there's nothing tangible, right? So it's kind of what I'm, what I'm getting at I suppose if that makes any sense.

Well, it has the appearance of we're muddling through. Nobody wants to really take the initiative. Everybody's afraid of the side effects. Of course, it is difficult to because within the UN Security Council, there are very different opinions. So everybody's, but I think maybe even those people are quite okay with the fact that it seems almost impossible to do something. Because nobody really knows what to do and everybody's afraid of negative side effects and it, it has. But then what's wise, you know, what's, what's the smart thing to do, just sit and wait and just let them sort it out. Or go in, and, and, and do the right thing maybe for now, to stop them for now. Very difficult questions, very frustrating to all people that are watching this situation. And Efrat, what's your take on that, what should we do or not do?

Efrat: Well I like to believe that this is a complicated issue. As says the classmate. Yes, we're seeing that they are doing a, a lot of atrocities and we are just sitting down. And even Muslim scholars have condemned, and they wrote an open letter colored to al-Baghdadi. Stating under Islamic law what they are doing wrong and what they are doing that is not based on Islam. They basically call themselves Caliph without the consensus of the Muslim community in general. The problem when it comes to the government trying to go into a conflict is that according to the public international law, there is something called intervention by invitation. So basically and you're the expert in this, you can correct me.

Any country cannot go and invade another country unless the same country itself asks for help.

Then, the problem that we have is that ISIS, being in Iraq, there is some parts of the government from Saddam Hussein, that they are agree with ISIS. And there are other ones who are not. So, which one, the international community is going to listen? Are we going to listen to those that ISIS supports? Those who are afraid and say don't call, we don't want this worse. Or we need, or we have the responsibility to actually protect our countries first, then the affected country. And lead them to basically solve their issues, because it's more about religion. Which is a, it's

a very uncomfortable situation. >> In the case of Iraq it's relatively simple; this Iraqi government asks other countries to help them. So in that case there's no intervention or there's intervention, but definitely not an invasion.

And there is on behalf of the central government in Baghdad to restore the territory integrity of, of Iraq. It's a bit of a different case in Syria where there is activities and I'm I guess Damascus is not unhappy with any airstrikes against IS. But nonetheless, it's a violation in their eyes of their territory integrity. So then the situation's a bit more difficult.

So it's about states, it's about maybe religion. But I, I'm not so sure as you mentioned a lot of people say well IS wrongly is claiming the name Islamic State and caliphate. So it's a sensitive thing. That's why a lot of people would not like me to called IS, IS, Islamic State, although they themselves call them that way. Because, they do not have the legitimacy of an Islamic state. So, lots of sensitivities evolved in, in, in this, this question.

21.5 Question to Darren or Louisa on this

Should we do more? Should we have boots on the ground? Should we, quickly go after IS, the sooner the better with all means available? Or should we show more restraint?

Darren/Louisa: If I may, please. I, I think that, well, that's a very honorable stance to take the, sort of stepping up if you like. Or taking the, the coalition of the willing and the defense of a lot of people, I think that's very honorable. But at the same time, I think that the idea of that more soldiers and more fighting is going to eradicate ISIS, I think that's, that's insane in my opinion. I think if we look over the last, since maybe like, maybe post 9/11. I think the idea of using

The military to defeat like an ideology which effectively it is. I think is never going to is never going to win. And I think it's, there are cases in history where that's been the same. I also think that if we wanted to like you said, the archeological damage. To buildings and to infrastructure within these countries. Things, things like air strikes, I think they cause a lot more damage than, than, than good. I think if we look one of the, one of the, the lectures, there was a, a speech from someone from Amnesty International talking about the use of drone strikes and air strikes in certain regions of Pakistan and Afghanistan, and the damage caused there was, in my opinion, far more, troublesome in terms of a future response than, than they be good to it they create it. So in my opinion, I, I think

we should be doing something, but I think the, the use of more military force is, is not the way not the way, not the best use of our, our resources.

A question from Tom Basilar, and he's asking, will I S still exist in five years referring to this Coalition of the Willing and its battle against IS. Or will they go down fighting and maybe it's their sole aim to be defeated militarily. So will they exist and is their goal to really be defeated in the military sense? What do you think about that?

A good question and an easy one to answer if I had my crystal ball, but I forgot it at home so let's, let's try and disc, just answer that starting with, I don't know of course.

I do think that, we somehow, especially after last summer, betray IS as some kind of, miracle, unimaginable, very strong, etcetera. But, if we look at the battlefield situation, these days, we see that they are losing grounds in parts of Iraq.

Especially Tikrit area but also other parts of Iraq, also in Syria, in north east Syria other parts of the country Kobani the Kurds and Free Syrian Army are there on the march. So we have to be careful not to make IS bigger and stronger than they are, and today they, claimed responsibility for an act, the attack in Tunisia, and they said these are the first drops of a, of a, of a shower, of, of, of a lot more rain.

And that's, that's the way they have a huge impact on all of us, showing these atrocities. But, again let's be careful if we look at the map of Syria and Iraq, we see large swaths of land that are colored and dark this is IS country yeah it is, and it isn't. They need the support and they got the support of a lot of local organizations, local militias. And they might turn their back on IS also, again, similar to what happened, for instance, to the Taliban in Afghanistan. So, I, I do expect, that IS, is, in, will get it, will, will face a lot of difficulties in the months ahead. And if they start losing support from local militias that now join the ranks of I.S. that might be, happen a lot faster but they lose ground than, than we expect. Do I expect them to go down and, and not exist in five years times? No, because the brand name I.S. is very strong. Their call for action is very strong and they've got a lot of sympathizers they've got a lot of foreign fighters so they have a worldwide audience, a worldwide network of veterans and I think

that is very worrisome. So IS, on the ground, I think they can be beaten they can lose a lot of territory. But as a brand name, as an organization, as a banner.

An example to others to do something, I'm afraid we'll be confronted with that in the years to come and even after five years from now. And that brings me maybe to the issue of foreign fighters they are an important part of IS they are their ambassadors and a lot of people are worried that some of these foreign fighters when they come back to their different countries Tunisia, just to mention one, UK, US, Australia, as far as China. That, that is, something that countries are very much worried about, and it also relates to the question of, by maybe you can, maybe you can now, use this, interesting question to move to the issue of foreign fighters, Effra, you had an interesting question on that, that's why we invited you, so please go ahead.

Question: should government must prosecute fighters and charge them with treason. This is according to the U.S. article three section three, which say "treason against the United States shall consist only in letting war against them and hearing their enemies giving them aid and comfort and no person shall be convicted of treason unless testimony of two witnesses or a confession in open court. So therefore should governments prosecute these people that are trying to do that? Join them and them engaged in the act and they have the, the government should have the revoke permanently their citizenship because they're threatening eh, our country that was basically my question.

Answer: Thank you, interesting question, and a sensitive one that is on the agenda in many countries that, that are confronted with foreign fighters how to treat them. Are they, is this treason? Does this end your relationship with that country? Is that possible under international law? Very sensitive issues I think we all live in countries that have suggested these kinds of measures, or from countries I think in the UK this has been an issue in Canada probably, Ask the Netherlands, Louise I'm sure you followed the debate on this. We just had elections in the Netherlands and this issue was brought forward as well. This sensitive issue of, you know, can we revoke citizenship or can we even make people stateless? Can I hear you on that?

Louise: Yes well it's a very difficult question, actually and I think we have to be very careful of prosecute these foreign fighters, these girls and boys who choose to go to Syria or Iraq.

Because it doesn't define them that they made a choice to go to Iraq or Syria. And in the past we have seen that if we don't give them any chance anymore, they radicalize even more and they get isolated, and that's not what we want, we want them to de-radicalize. And, I don't think prosecute them for treason is the right way to solve the problem. To make them stateless is something also very difficult because you don't give them any chance and is that something we want in a free country and democracy? They have the choice to go, and well, I can imagine people say something like that get away, let's bring them to Iraq or Syria like. Aboutaleb, our Dutch mayor from Rotterdam says they have to get their passports, take them away. And let's you can go to Syria if you want to. I'm not sure if that's very it's a very good idea because they are Dutch citizens. And well, we have to tackle the problem which is deeper. And that's one of my questions as well.

They have a very good narrative IS, and these boys and girls believe in that narrative, so it's a very deep problem. Why do they want to go to Iraq or Syria? That's the bigger question then. Not whether they are prosecutors for treason or not then. It, it doesn't define them. Everyone makes wrong choices and some choices are more wrong than others. But it doesn't define the, the people eventually. So, I think we have to tackle the problem by looking to how to de-radicalize these, those people and maybe help them even. So, yeah, difficult situation.

Yeah it is, there are lots of restraints, legal ones, it is possible to make people stateless under a lot of national laws. That is not possible in international law there's lots of obstacles. Then the thing is, is it wise, is it smart? They might come back anyhow; I mean you can cross these borders without passport if you really want to.

On the other hand, you don't join groups that's, that, that do horrible things, but very often it's very difficult to prove. So there's a lot to say for that, maybe as a symbolic reason or in, in, in the public discourse about foreign fighters, it serves a purpose. Saying, well if you do this, you know, you're really cutting ties with your country. But, whether in the end, it's effective and if it's really, if we can really influence it, that's a different question. So, there's no easy answer there. Efrat, what would be your own answer to that, that question?

Efrat: Yes? Well, a, I too, I do see the danger of trying to prosecute someone of such reasons provided they are 16, 17 years old. But here is the standpoint of upholding the law, upholding the law at least in the United States. I'm not very sure if it's in, in Europe. A person that is 16 years or over is capable to understand the implications that

they are going through. And that you try to radicalize a person is very rare. A person that becomes radical in their own religion, especially Islam, is very rare; it takes a lot of work. So you try making that person understand that the views about Islam and Quran are totally distorted. That's why these people engage in this type of act of indoctrinization. This is something that they are constantly battling. I even read on the news that they are over there putting in a videos in the mosque. And they are there all the time constantly reminding you that this is what it says the Quran. But is not really what it says Quran, it is their interpretation. So to you try to delete that disk from a person and make it a new reformat maybe the hardware is going to take a lot. And then, we're going to control the problem of when these people come to this country, what about if they just lie. If this person tell them, go there, lie say to them that you are not part anymore and let's do something else. Then we endanger our countries, so I think that it's a very sensitive issue that we are going to face.

Thank you Efrat. Before I go on to Jason, I would like to hear you go on to this Jason there's a related question from the audience about the threat level. I think Shaneen can you let us know?

Jason: Yes that's a question that by Ron Frederick, and he's referring to a recent article in The New York Times. And it indicates that foreign fighters within IS are mainly there for religious reasons, that's what the article says. So it says they might not even want to return and those people that do return maybe they're just the dropouts. And they are not really planning any attacks when they come back. So, should we really see them as threats when they come back, and how should we, what kind of measure should we take, then?

Well, maybe that's, that's a good question for, Jason to answer. So, what should we do with these, foreign fighters that return? Are you still with the police, and is this also, something that's on your plate? Well, currently in Canada we're looking at actually this is very, the timing is, is kind of impeccable with this discussion and what's happening in my country. Because we're currently debating a terrorism bill which is going to expand the powers of police in intelligence agencies. You know, to arrest suspects and definitely to, to search there's a huge outcry about this as well. Because it, the potential does exist for you know, the infringement on civil liberties which I, I think is reasonable to some extent. It's a lot akin to the Patriot Act in the United States

You know just broadening the powers of the rule of law. Now the question is, you know, is this the case of, you know, killing a fly with a sledgehammer? Is this you know, it, what, what, what is the efficacy of something like this, right? Now, getting back to foreign fighters coming back. And I think Louise brought up a very good point and so did Efrat. With regards to, you know, okay, we revoke these people's citizenship when, you know, going over there. Well, I'd like to expand on that by saying, well, what do we do with these people? Where do they go? I mean, if they can't come home and we're, you know, it's like, suppose we do send people in there, you know, close to. Well, what's the end-result for these people? What's the net result? Right? And, and if no one can answer that question maybe this isn't the best route to take.

I, I don't have the answers obviously. But what I would suggest is perhaps it might be appropriate in this instance to look at it on a case by case basis. I'm not so sure I agree that, that de-radicalization is completely impossible. I mean, I think there are some people that are, that are hardliners they're over there, they're, they're dedicated to the cause, but there's probably a lot of followers too. And if, if we take a look at some of the subject matter on the course, some of the readings. Studies done by yourself, by Jenine, by other scholars about why they go over there. Well we found that, you know, we see that a lot of them are disassociated with the societies they come from. They, they're looking to belong to something. Well if, if that's you know, if, if where, where they, where they went, they don't, you know, it doesn't exist anymore, well then what, what's the net result? Where, where do they go, right? What, what happens to them? Maybe we can de-radicalize them.

And, and I think maybe it might be worth trying out, right? Just because, I mean, it would take a lot of money, it would take a lot of time, it would take a lot of effort. But, but I mean, if you look at the cost of that compared to what we might end up having to deal with later on. Should we take a hard approach against them and, you know, evict them from the country? You know, we might be creating bigger problems for ourselves later. This might be an investment in, in you know, averting similar situations that are worse in the future. That, that's my take on it I guess. Yeah, thank you also your remark about we have to maybe look at this from case to case. Maybe that's possible for countries like Canada or the Netherlands, but what about Tunisia with 3,000 people out there? That's, that's also, we should also think about that foreign fighters. Especially in the West we think of people from Europe

and North Africa, North America and Australia. But there are thousands from other countries. And, and also these countries are very worried about this question. What to do when they return.

I think Ron quoting, quote the New York Times saying that a lot of them that come back to Western countries are disillusioned. That's also one of the findings of an unpublished study here in the Netherlands that looked into those that returned. They're not die hard fighters. They were, but they returned and they were among the first wave to go there, they're very disillusioned. Maybe that's different for those that go now and directly join the ranks of the Islamic State. Then there's also a moral question to it. Islamic State stands in my eyes for well, what is it comparable to. Probably one of, you know, it's, it's, it's an incredibly violent organization. That defies all rules of all religions and international laws and, and whatever standard decency. So we, and even if they are 16, 17, they joined that group. So that, that, that remains a very difficult one. On the other hand, we have all traditions, legal traditions, religious traditions where we give people a chance to come back. And I think we should you know, find a balance somehow. I think there's people, it's, if we know of people that have beheaded people or they have committed atrocities. I think, a lot of societies, will not even accept these people to return. But a case to case basis, I think, is probably the most, the smartest and the most proportional way.

But if you sometimes see these pictures and see the beheadings of some of these people that go out there to help the, the people of Syria. And you realize it's a guy from Britain.

I'm, I'm sure that a lot of people say, well, let's just, let's make sure this guy never comes back. So, it's a difficult and sensitive issue.

Darren maybe you have something to add to that? >> Yeah okay, I just quickly I think that well, well I sort of agree with Jason and Louise to an extent. I think that persecuting these people or trying these people for these things is, is, is seems like a, may seem like a good idea on a level. But I, I, think that we, we already have and most societies, we have a sort of, right now, a sort of, us and them mentality. And I think that perpetuating this, this, this mentality is only going to make it a little bit a more caustic environment, if you like.

So like, I mean, these young people who have been radicalized or, or who went over to commit to this as Jason said, they already felt completely isolated. They already felt disenfranchised from the, from the communities. I

think if we come, maybe if they come back and, and we continue to, you know, okay I'm going to try you under this Terrorism Act. And maybe sort of to an extent maybe hardens their belief that they're being persecuted because they are Muslim or because they are they are the same, ideology. So, I think, like, maybe, Jason suggested, a sort of case by case scenario has to be considered. I think, in general terms, I think, it, I'm more, I look at how we can de-radicalize these people. And look to sort of have a less, less aggressive stance towards it. And look towards building something more sustainable for future. Rather than, that maintaining a sort of hardened, a hardened approach. I think the hardened approach won't work in the long term.

It's good to make the distinction between the difference between long, long term and short term. At the same time again you see these pictures of beheadings, you know these are citizens of your country. There are a number of people say well, go out there and, and, and, and, and use your military force over there to make sure to stop these people and kill them. And, and, and make sure that they cannot do more harm over there. That's even being more, maybe you could say the ultimate hard approach. That of course is a daily practice. Janine and I and, and a colleague of ours, Alastair Reid Arch are looking into pathways once these people are there. What are their options to return peacefully, to return home to stage an attack, to go to other places, try to live in that country peacefully or not? There are many different options. And, and whatever you do, and whatever measure you take. For instance, taking away passport or persecuting them has an impact on their choices and their pathways. And I think we have to really think through all the different options and all the side effects of our measures. Being too hard can cause problems in, in the long run, but maybe too soft can do the same. So it's very difficult. Against a much politicized background with regard to the issue of foreign fighters. So we're probably not going to finance this here to this question. And I think it depends on what is personal opinion. And again, I think what we might agree on is we have to look at it from a case to case basis. Those that have gone to Syria in 2013 are different people that have gone today. And those that join IS are different than those that joined other groups. So let's take that into account. And then, you have also people who joined Kurdish militias and other groups or join the ranks of the Assad regime or Iraqi militia. So the picture's so diverse that there is, I guess, no general answer to this question.

Louise, may I ask you to again state your question. You already mentioned it, but could you maybe raise the question again? And, and maybe also explain why this is an important question to you.

Thank you, well my question was, do you think counter narrative will be effective way to combat IS? As we all know IS uses a, a strong propaganda to, to recruit foreign fighters to mobilize them.

And using the Internet by using videos. They have a strong narrative, a strong story well yeah, to mobilize them. And that's a huge problem as we all can see. And there was this debate going on if we have to use a counter narrative in order to fight IS. And the European Union even started some kind of initiative to make videos in all that will counter the narrative of IS. So, my question is if, if, you think it's an effective way to, fight them, in a not military way, so. Yeah, thank you good question. A question that is on the agenda, for a lot of governments. They look into the possibilities. And I saw Efrat nodding, but I'm not sure if you agree. So, if you were, responsible for, or if this, this question was on your table. Do you think, could you develop a strong counter narrative? Do you think it's hopeless? And, or if you see some opportunities, what would be the opportunity? What would be the narrative to fight the narrative or to deal with the narrative of the story, the propaganda of the Islamic State?

Well, I do agree that they do have a very strong ISIS as a, as a group. They do have a very strong propaganda media, bombarding these young kids. Basically, they're portraying like this is a game, like Mortal Combat. You're coming here, you're having Call of Duty game. And maybe that is why these young kids are attracted to that, I'm feeling. The problem with this is that trying as a Western government to culture attack that propaganda that is based on religion. Because we have to also understand that their point of view is based on religion. They are moving all these brave fighters based on religion. So on a western side if you're not a Muslim, and you do not understand what is Islam, or what is the Quran or what it says. Trying to make a propaganda to counter attack, so one that is moving en masse based on religion is quite difficult. Because they will say, oh, the Western, they just want to make us believe that our religion is evil, is bad. And they are saying something that is, not appropriate. So maybe if all the Western countries try to make allegation with Islamic corners within the country. And try to, attack that in media from ISIS and all this propaganda on the Islamic side. That they say look, this is Islam, I am a Muslim scholar, I am a Muslim I know what is going on, you're doing completely wrong. Maybe it could work in the future, in the long run, but trying to see it from an outside perspective is going to be a little bit difficult. So we basically try to eradicate that people keep moving because of their faith, and going and enjoying them. Especially young, when you're young, you don't believe what your parent says, it's the same. You don't believe what adult says or parent

that are even there says. >> Thank you. Well, it should be mentioned that, that some of the leading scholars which are regarded. Like, prestigious scholars in Egypt, for instance, have come out with these kind of statements. But there are other ones that are more active on the internet that all have a different following. That said that come up with different kind of statement that's support the violent Jihads. So it, its' difficult and it should be men, should be stressed here that a number of peace scholars have spoken out against this violent Jihad. And it's not up to you to go to Syria and Iraq. But as you said some of these, especially younger kids, they, well, they do not listen, or they do not recognize the prestigious background of these people. And, and they, they are cherry picking, whatever they find on the, on the internet. So, it's, it's, I guess, it's, it's, a little bit more difficult, and a little bit difficult.

A number sure than it's, western governments can come up with these kinds of answers. But they're trying.

Other reactions to that, maybe Jason do you think, the Canadian, authorities can come up with a, a, a, a, a counter narrative? That will stop one, or two, or 20 or, or potential foreign fighters.

>> I'm not exactly sure.

I'll say this much. One of, I mean, there, that's not really, at least from what I've seen so far, doesn't really seem to be an option on the table. They, we seem trying to be more trying to get Muslim, communities in the country involved. In order to get us, you know, get them to, I mean it's not very hard to, you know. But to get them to help us to, to educate, you know, the youth in their own communities of why joining IS is a terrible idea.

So long story short I don't, I'm not sure that's been considered. I imagine it maybe has at higher levels, but I will say this much. And I think Efrat brings up an excellent point, with regards to, you know, the target audience of counter narratives. And that is, that we really do have to understand our target. We have to know what makes these people tick. Because, you know, if the counter narrative is to is, you know, the intent is to dissuade their opinion, to get to, you know, to help make them lose. You know, to, to, or well, to get ISIS to lose hearts and minds, or even to scare these people we have to understand them. And I'm not, I'm not sure we do. And I mean not only that, even if we do look at the result of some of these people. Some of these people are, are, are dead set again, about you know, dying for the Caliphate. How do you, how do you influence somebody like that, right? So it's, it's certainly a challenge. I think counter narratives could be, could be effective. But, you know, we really have to understand

the target before, before we could expect that to work. >> Yeah, I agree and having talked to a number of people that we didn't know then but in the end left for Syria, one that also died there. This, this guy any narrative, counter narrative would not have worked. He was so convinced that he should go there and may, and, and maybe even die there, and, and in the end, he did. And I think most counter narratives are not aimed at that group. They're aimed at sympathizers, people that flirt with IS, that are not that serious yet.

And maybe it's also good to have, a narrative, to explain what's going on as Efrat has said. Try to explain to a general public, Muslims and non-Muslims, what is going on there. And why, IS is, in fact, a wrong name for that organization, Islamic State. Because, actually they, they are against the law of principles that most Muslims stand for. So I think sometimes that the counter narrative that governments, especially western governments might want to develop. Are more or should maybe aimed at a general public trying to explain what's going on. And I think might be a bit too hopeful if you think you can really stop those die-hards from going. And at the same time we see an enormous need for among the general public to try to understand what's going on. To what extent it is a thing that is related to Islam because it is, has a link to Islam. And to what extent this is not the case and, and, and that there's other versions of Islam. And, and a lot of people against IS, actually fighting against IS in Syria and Iraq. And they're also Muslims and they die by the thousands because of the activities of IS. So counter narrative also depends, I guess, against what audience do you have in mind? And maybe we should think about a general audience. >> Perhaps more than those diehards. So, are there any more questions or do you have a pressing question that popped up while you were listening to what was going on? >> Well, there was one question a bit linked to this this issue of counter narrative is by Ziyaat Abdul Kadir. If I pronounce it correctly. But he said, he thinks that counter narrative is not working because we only see British people fighting IS. So it really takes it one step further from counter narrative to really be active in the fight against IS. So, I'm not sure if how can we see that? It's also, it should also be a goal of the counter narrative. >> Well, could we go to mobilize people to go out and fight there. And of course, some do. People join the ranks of Kurdish groups not only from other parts of the Middle East, but also western countries. There was even a German girl, 19 years old, killed last week. Who was with a left wing organization that joined the ranks of the Kurds? So but we do see I think partly, unfortunately lots of sectarian groups. Shiites from Afghanistan Yemen, Iraq joining groups in Syria. All kinds of Sunni joining. Of

course IS and other militias and there's foreign involvement by many different people is making, I think the problem even problem. So personally I would not be in favor of attracting even more people to that region to fight. Making any possible future negotiation, peace, impossible. But there's a lot more people that go and join and that are foreign fighters than just Sunni Muslims joining IS. So in that sense then the problem is even a lot bigger than just simply IS. We're almost at 7 o'clock Leiden time, so time for me to thank the participants of this discussion. Thank you Jason, Darin, Ephrat, Louise and also thank you Jeanine for sharing your thoughts with us. Very difficult, well, very interesting questions that are difficult to answer. But I hope that this way by discussing these sensitive and difficult issues with people from around the globe with different backgrounds, different geographical backgrounds and whatever backgrounds you have, I think that's the way we, we need to somehow to find out how we deal with IS foreign fighters. An issue, which I'm afraid, will be on the agenda for the coming years. So this is definitely not the end of the discussion, but just a start and I hope you'll join us in a, in a future discussion. So, again, thank you very much and I hope you enjoyed this discussion and well, all the best. And I hope to see you another time in one of the Coursera courses that we provide here at Leiden University. Thank you very much.

25 Chapter 4: The Conclusion and Recommendations

22.1 Conclusion

There is general disagreement on the definition of terrorism. After having studied various definitions certain defining parameters based on which a definition is being proposed.

Defining Parameters

- | | | | |
|----|----------------------|---|-----------------------------------|
| a. | <u>Activity</u> | - | Use or Threat of Use of Force |
| b. | <u>Motivation</u> | - | Religious, Political, Ideological |
| c. | <u>Target</u> | - | Civilian Targets (men & material) |
| d. | <u>Aim / Purpose</u> | - | Instill Fear |

Proposed Definition. Terrorism is the intentional use, or threat to use violence against civilians or civilian targets, to instill fear in order to attain political aims

22.2 Recommendations

Conceptual Contours to Combat Terrorism

Counter Terrorism Policy

Most of the modern states after 9/11 reviewed their internal security concerns and adopted appropriated security policies. In the latest security policies of Russia, USA, Germany, UK and many other states, terrorism has taken the central theme. The internal security organizational structures were restructured to fight the new threat. Peshawar incident of 16 December 2014 was the turning point in the history of Pakistan, basing upon which National Action Plan has been formulated and Apex committees have been formed at provincial level , Following needs to be done at priority by Pakistan in this regard:-

- a. Pakistan must define and announce its counter terrorism policy taking into account the local, regional and global threat
- b. The policy should be ratified by the parliament to give it the required political and legal status as being done to establish Military courts to convict terrorists in Jan 2015.

National Strategy:

National strategy should be based on following principles:-

- a. Harmonious with political aspirations of the people
- b. Decentralization of power and devolution of authority
- c. All citizen want peace and security which is linked with prosperity- thus the requirement of improving national economy.
- d. The causes of terrorism must be identified in totality. The sectarian, ethnic and nationalist forces must be engaged in a constructive dialogue to find lasting political solutions.
- e. Debate all controversial national issues to win confidence and support of political parties.

- f. Greater provincial autonomy will restrict the breeding grounds for terrorism
- g. Removal of regional disparities, balance and equitable distribution of national resources must be ensured
- h. Good governance and social justice would help reduce the sense of deprivation and frustration which leads to violent behavior
- i. Comprehensive national Education policy focusing on national ideology and integration is promulgated through consensus.
- j. Madrassa reforms and registration of all sorts of Madras including their funding.

Suggested Approach:

Pakistan faces multi-dimensional threat; therefore, our response should also be multifaceted. We must adopt a four pronged approach based upon the following thrust lines:-

- i. **Deterrence:** To dis-incentivize the act, or to deter the actor by sending a clear and unequivocal message to potential terrorist that he has far more to lose than to gain from committing a terrorist act. The LEA and Special Courts (established under Terrorism Act) need to play a pro-active role.
- ii. **Incapacitation:** The ‘Master Mind’, the ‘Planner’ and the ‘Executioner’, constitute three links in the terrorism chain. Good intelligence network, modern surveillance means, duly supported by efficient law enforcement agencies should be able to identify and incapacitate each tier.
- iii. **Persuasion:** To persuade the actor not to undertake the terrorist act through education, motivation and rehabilitation. The civil society plays an important role in influencing the behavior of the actor. The Politico-religious parties must be taken onboard to address the issue of extremism and sectarianism.
- iv. **Prevention:** Inequality, deprivation, social exclusion, and denial of access to political power constitute the recipe for breakdown of social norms and order. Not having a fair chance in life and being deprived of hope are the most incendiary root causes of violence and conflict. For eradication of such causes, following steps are suggested:-

- (1) Bringing the sub nationalist elements into main stream politics.
- (2) Balance and equitable division in all provinces.
- (3) Addressing the misperception of masses through CBM.

- (4) Early and mutually acceptable resolution of outstanding issues between provinces and the center.

Indirect Measures to Combat Terrorism

1. Political Reforms

- a. Federal Structure: The repeated emergence of ethno-national movements indicates that the sheer size of provinces haunts the federation. As a result we find continued resurgence of issues such as Kalabagh Dam, water distribution, NFC Award and ethnic polarization etc. To get out of the federal melee and the menace, either mutually accepted equitable share be ensured to every province; or a serious thought be given to redefinition of provincial boundaries.
- b. Primacy of the Constitution: The real authority of the federation stems out of its adopted constitution. By and large there is a general consensus on 1973 Constitution. However, various governments, for their own interests, have meddled with the constitution in one way or the other. This has led to no of controversies. There is a need to uphold the sanctity of the original Constitution. The amendments should only be brought about through a political process so that the changes have broad based acceptability.
- c. National Integration: Strong and stable political system is a prerequisite for national integration. There is a need to revive the political institutions in accordance with the norms of democracy to ensure that all segments of society find a representation in national decision making process.

Writ of the Government

- a. Establish of State Authority: Establishment of authority of state should form the foremost pillar of our national strategy. None should be considered above the law and all political pressures should be defied while dealing with crime, nationalism and extremism. The dissident elements rejecting state authority must be dealt with an iron hand.
- b. State Laws: In Pakistan, implementation is a greater problem than enactment of laws. Nevertheless we can ill afford different sets of state laws for the same crime e.g. Anti-Terrorist Laws, Sharia Laws, PATA / FATA Laws and the laws governed by Pakistan Penal Code. These be merged together to end exploitation by police and to bring

all citizens under one jurisdiction. Recently in the month of February 2015 the government has implemented certain new laws with enhanced punishments which are loudspeaker act, wall chalking act, show of weapons etcetera. These laws will certainly have impact on the society in curbing the terrorism.

Judicial Reforms

- i. Anti-Terrorism Act: The 1997 Terrorist Act gives wide ranging powers to the police to bring any crime in this category, an aspect which has come under severe criticism from national and international human rights orgs. There is a dire need to redefine acts of terrorism so that minor crimes are not liable for litigation under the Act
- ii. Restructuring of Judiciary: For fair and speedy dispensation of justice following measures are suggested:-
 - a. No of courts to be increased based on population statistics
 - b. System of cut off dates to be introduced for completion of cases
 - c. The system of judicial holidays be done away with
 - d. Strict system of accountability be enforced
 - e. A separate into network under Supreme Court/ High Court Chief Justices be set.

Social Reforms

- a. Strengthening the Civil Society: 'Civil society' refers to institutions, movements and socio-cultural orgs which are not directly controlled by the state. National policies stem from the culture and values of the society as a whole. A well-educated and conscious civil society would help in tackling threats like terrorism. Our endeavor must be a strong civil society so as to raise the participation level of the civil communities
- b. Human Resource Development: The formation of Human Council by the government is an appreciable step. This aspect must be pursued diligently through a well deliberated programmer. It will greatly assist in alleviating poverty and unemployment, thus making it difficult for extremists and terrorists to exploit and muster the frustrated and dejected elms of the society

c. Raising Literacy Level: A clear perception of national issues is not possible without enhancing the mental horizon of the masses. Improvement in literacy level is essential to form a respectable society; cap of differentiating between right and wrong.

Control of Religious Extremism

a. Modernization of Madrassa Education: Government has already taken certain steps towards modernizing the Madrassa Education. However a large no of Madrassas are yet to be registered. The Madrassa Education Board constituted under Madrassa Ordinance 2002 needs to be made more effect through better funding and patronage

b. Sectarian Harmony. Following needs to be done:-

- i. Scholars of all sects should be encouraged to propagate common points of view and denounce sectarian violence on media to promote religious harmony and national solidarity
- ii. All political parties be made to present meaningful agenda in their election/party manifestoes to eliminate sectarianism
- iii. Only those candidates be allowed to contest elections who are free from sectarian leanings
- iv. Passing of judgment on the Islamic credentials of another Muslim be made a punishable act
- v. Complete ban on sale, purchase and playing of provocative audios be ensured
- vi. Publishing of controversial literature having sectarian overtones be banned and existing literature destroyed

Economic Measures:

Although, our economy at macro level has shown good signs of improvement, the effects are yet to trickle down at micro level. There is an atmosphere of gen dissatisfaction and uncertainty amongst the masses which needs to be addressed forthwith. Short term measures like employment opportunities, relief in utility prices and check on rates of daily use commodities are essential.

Direct Measures to Combat Terrorism

Establishment of Counter Terrorism Institute: There is a need to establish a Center Terrorism Institute, where research work could be carried out on all aspects related to terrorism

Improvement of Law Enforcement Agencies:

1. **Police:** Following is recommended in this regard:
 - (1) **Reorganizing the Police Forces:** The police force is already being reorg; however, there is a need to expedite the process to enable the police force to deal with modern/hi-tech crimes and 21st Century terrorists
 - (2) **Improvement in Public Image:** While, use of force in dealing with a terrorist sit is inescapable, the police needs to improve its public image and be friendlier with the public. New inductions of smart, educated and motivated individuals may be resorted to. Motorway Police is a case in pt.
2. **Para-Military Forces:** Para-Mil forces augment the police force in maintaining law and order. However, they are not adequately trained to combat terrorism. This force be made effective to realize its true potential so as to reduce employment of Army on such duties
3. **Army:** In order to counter terrorism within an overall integrated and graduated Government response, employment of Army may be considered. Inadequacies need to be addressed through specialized training.

Overhaul of Intelligence Agencies: The intelligence agencies should modernize their system of Intelligence collection, analysis, investigations and interrogations and other such operations. The efficacy of IB should be improved. There is a definite requirement of providing better trained and qualified manpower as well as modern equipment to the intelligence agencies

Terrorist Financing: The banking system must be modernized for better fin con. We must switch over to integrated computerized system of banking to monitor inflows of money to terrorist orgs. This will also enable the LEA / Intel agencies to trace out the black / drug money used by the terrorist orgs

De-weaponization: De-weaponization of the society should be a prim to enforce a check on terrorism. Attempts have been made in the past which could not yield the desired results. The campaign needs to be undertaken with more vigor, better planning and a system of incentives and punitive measures. Government policy to issue NADRA based weapon license and to ban all licenses with effect from 26 February 2015 is a step in right direction.

Media Policy: Our national media is in the process of attaining maturity but would take some time to strike a balance between criticism and rationality. Whereas, the elect media is behaving with a certain amount of respect, the print media has not come out of the regional politics. There is a need to formulate media policies in accordance with the national interests.

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